The agreement to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme has sharply divided opinion.
There is a risk of it being oversold as much over-condemned. It is not going to bring peace to the Middle East and it will not turn Iran into a moderate and easy-going power. The intention, however, was only to stop Iran becoming a nuclear state, and on this vital test, the deal should succeed. Iran cannot become a nuclear threshold state — that is, one that could with a push acquire weapons — for at least 15 years and in practice much longer.
Without a deal, Iran could become a nuclear power well before this time. The current sanctions regime could not prevent it and pre-emptive military strikes would be a huge gamble. The deal does allow Iran to enrich uranium, but doing that to a low level does not break any international agreements. Only enrichment to weapons grade causes concern. Here, the limits on programmes are real, and the verification provisions will be intrusive, more so than many anticipated.
All but a couple of percent of the enriched uranium already accumulated will have to be given up, and the number of centrifuges kept running reduced and not upgraded. The Arak research reactor will be reconfigured so that it can no longer produce plutonium for a bomb. Iran will also be prohibited from exploring technologies relevant to nuclear weapons design.
Read: In the long term, building a bomb will be easier for Iran
Therefore if it wants a nuclear weapon before 2030, Iran will have to engage in cheating on a massive scale, to a level that would carry a high risk of discovery. State of the art sensors, seals and cameras will watch key facilities and every aspect of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the movement of scientists, will be tracked. Were it to be caught cheating, the issue could then be taken back to the Security Council and sanctions restored.
No single power, for example Russia, could stop this with a veto. Such a gross violation would also risk a military response. Even after 2030, Iran will still be covered by the same International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring regime that guards against other states proliferating.
If left unfettered, the Iranians could have built nuclear weapons within a year or so. This would have had dire consequences, giving Tehran more freedom of action while encouraging other states in the region, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to develop their own nuclear programmes.
There are, however, plenty of vexatious issues left to resolve. The end of sanctions, it is feared, will give Iran an economic boost and embolden it as a regional power. But relief will only come progressively, as the deal is implemented. To get the main benefit, Iran will need to open up to foreign investment and reform. There is not going to be a sudden surge of Iranian oil onto international markets.
The wider consequences of this deal will depend on the broader context. The Middle East has become a progressively more dangerous, violent and in many respects confusing place. Iran is one of the reasons.
The US might come under pressure to compensate the deal’s many regional opponents by taking a tougher line against Iran in other areas.
Optimists will hope that the deal strengthens moderate elements in Iran, and it might, but there no guarantees. Iranian politics is complex. Which is why the safest assessment remains that the deal achieves what it was asked to do; but not peace in our time.
Sir Lawrence Freedman is Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London
