Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a known instigator and participant in sectarian conflicts. It engages with proscribed terrorist groups and manages vast criminal networks including a narcotics ring it uses to fund its violence.

The IRGC operates as a distinct force within the Iranian state rather than being an official arm of the government. This group combines aspects of a religious police force and an international terrorist organisation, employing repressive tactics against Iranian protesters domestically while also engaging in widespread sectarian warfare abroad. The UK has again missed an opportunity to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, despite the Foreign Office facing as many as 15 credible threats to kill or kidnap UK residents in the last two years.

Under the leadership of Qasem Soleimani until his death in 2020, the IRGC’s foreign operations branch, known as the Quds Force, gained notoriety. Soleimani orchestrated the formation of militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, involving the group in political conflicts and civil wars. The Quds Force also assassinated opponents and protesters, all while evading international condemnation and sanctions.

Soleimani himself became a renowned figure, touring battlefields and orchestrating reprisals, such as the brutal siege of Aleppo and the capture of Kirkuk from Iraqi Kurds. His actions became such a nuisance that the US targeted and killed him. Following his death, the IRGC has continued its terrorism under less prominent leadership. Throughout the past decade, the group has been directly involved in or responsible for ordering its affiliated militias to kill political figures and journalists in Lebanon and Iraq, including notable individuals such as Hisham Al-Hashimi and Lokman Slim. These actions undeniably fall within the definition of international terrorism.

The IRGC has embarked on a new stage of its agenda, plotting the assassination of Iranian dissidents and enemies of the regime in Europe and the Americas. The US Department of Justice has alerted critics such as John Bolton and Masih Alinejad that they were targets of assassination plots organised by the IRGC in recent years. In Britain, members of critical media outlets such as Iran International have been informed by the police that the IRGC has made attempts on their lives, employing hired criminals and hitmen and surveilling their offices and residences. It is crucial to recognise that these acts constitute terrorism. The fact that these assassination attempts have thus far been unsuccessful does not negate that.

Countries such as the UK, already burdened with countering terror plots by proscribed organisations like Al-Qaeda, Daesh and domestic extremist groups, must designate and impose sanctions on IRGC forces and their proxies if they engage in similar behaviour.
The global community is grappling with similar dilemmas, and Australia, in particular, is engaged in a lively debate. As protests persist in Iran, entering their fifth month, the pervasive violent influence of the IRGC is increasingly evident. The IRGC’s members serve as the regime’s protectors and hired enforcers, perpetrating torture and murder as their primary activities.

As the IRGC continues to import and deploy militiamen to brutalise and target civilians, nations worldwide are reassessing their perceptions of the Revolutionary Guards. Instead of viewing the IRGC as an unconventional branch of the Iranian state, they now recognise it as a military entity with its own history of violence and internal motives. The IRGC is an armed group, not a legitimate national military force.

Proscription is not just a matter of semantics; it carries profound implications for national security, diplomacy and the lives of countless individuals who find themselves in the crossfire of the IRGC’s actions. The IRGC holds dominion over much of Iran’s capital and mineral wealth. Were the UK to take action on proscription, it could then feasibly sanction one of the central supports of the regime. This is clearly a UK priority — demonstrated by the government’s decision to expand the criteria by which Iran’s supporters and companies can be put under sanctions.

Proscription would also help prevent attacks, allowing us to make use of anti-terror legislation to freeze assets and facilitate surveillance over suspected attackers. It would encourage other nations to make the same declaration, allowing joint policies such as on immigration powers, halting the movement of IRGC agents internationally and obstructing their operations.

The IRGC will never exhibit normal military behaviour or operate in a legitimate manner. The undeniable conclusion is that Iran’s regime relies primarily on a terrorist organisation to maintain its grip on power. We must proscribe it if we are to help the people of Iran see the end of this regime and the IRGC’s oppression.

Dr Azeem Ibrahim OBE is a Director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington DC and Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College