Doha is little more than a miserable fishing village struggling along the coast for several miles and more than half in ruins. The suq (market) consisted of mean fly-infested hovels, the roads were dusty tracks, there was no electricity and the people had to fetch their water in skins and cans from wells two or three miles outside the town.
So wrote the British political resident in Doha, Qatar’s capital, in 1940. Today Qatar is spending in the region of $200 billion to provide infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup – some 60 times South Africa’s expenditure for the same event a decade ago. The oil rich states of the Gulf – the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman – have transformed their cities into architectural wonders amidst controversy about poor treatment of the builders – labourers mainly from impoverished regions of the Indian sub-continent. Even so, the changes have been remarkable. The prospect of trade and a mutual fear of Iran has subsequently forged links with Israel. Netanyahu visited Oman (October 2018) and Chad (January 2019) and there will be an Israeli pavilion at the Expo Trade Fair in Dubai in 2020 despite the absence of diplomatic relations.
Israel’s approach towards the Gulf states began to evolve out of its periphery doctrine, first formulated in the 1950s, in which states on the edge of the Arab world such as Ethiopia and Turkey as well as embattled minorities such as the Kurds and South Sudanese would prove to be trustworthy allies.
The origin of the Gulf states lies in the Sunni Muslim tribes which emerged from Arabia in the eighteenth century and settled in the region. Its leaders were recognised as kings and emirs by the British, the central imperial power at that time. Ruling families dominated – al-Sabah (Kuwait), al-Khalifa (Bahrain), al-Thani (Qatar), al-Said (Oman), al-Nahyan and al-Maktoum (United Arab Emirates).
British withdrawal east of Suez in the 1960s essentially forced independence on these states. Some such as the seven Trucial states united as the Emirates while Qatar struck out on its own. All were however sandwiched in between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran with initially little possibility of forging their own destiny. They felt pressured to join the Saudi-led oil boycott following Israel’s victory in the Yom Kippur war in 1973. However it was the fear of the ayatollahs’ seizure of power in Iran in 1979 that led to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council two years later. This also catalysed a move towards clandestine links with Israel. Indeed King Fahd of Saudi Arabia’s peace plan of June 1981 – while falling on the deaf ears of the ruling Likud – essentially recognised Israel as part and parcel of the Middle East. While it also indicated the Gulf region’s strong support for the Palestinians, its own worries about Iran took poll position in its policies.
The Oslo Accords of 1993 unblocked relations with many Arab states. There was an official Israeli delegation to Bahrain to discuss environmental cooperation and a trade mission to Qatar. Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres met Sheikh Qaboos of Oman in Muscat in 1994.
Relations however plunged with the demise of the peace process and the dominance of Palestinian Islamism during the al-Aqsa intifada with its accompanying glorification of suicide bombers. When there were conflicts such as in Operation Cast Lead in 2009 with large numbers of Palestinian dead, relations with Israel were placed in cold storage. However what united Netanyahu with the monarchies of the Gulf States was the expansion of Iranian influence – a Shia Crescent from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Golan Heights. In part, this was due to the vacuum left by the US debacle in Iraq, but also to the deep fear of Iran’s developing nuclear ability. Indeed Oman kept channels open to Teheran such that Sheikh Qaboos’s intervention averted a possible Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2011 –and this in turn led to quiet mediation between the Americans and the Iranians. The Omani backchannel led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 which extracted Iran’s nuclear prowess from other military activity. While nuclear weapons were seemingly removed from the political equation, conventional Iranian missile units were embedding themselves in Syria, pointing in the direction of Israel. The JCPOA unnerved both Tel Aviv and Riyadh and deepened their antagonism towards the Obama administration. All this changed with the election of Donald Trump who revoked the agreement and imposed biting sanctions on Iran.
While there are certainly internal differences between some of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, there is a greater fear that a conflict with Iran might break out at any moment. Last month, Qatar attended a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Saudi Arabia about Iranian actions despite being ostracised and boycotted by its neighbours for its independent stance. The fear of the ayatollahs has been reflected in more overt relations with Israel. The Emirati Foreign Minister defended Israel’s right to attack Iranian targets in Syria. It is said that an Emirati military delegation recently visited Israel and that there have been joint military exercises in Greece. It is believed that while the Mossad has expanded its teaching of Farsi, the Qatari Ministry of the Interior has promoted the teaching of Hebrew. Israeli businesses proliferate in the Emirates while being registered in third countries. But as Ian Black, the former diplomatic editor of the Guardian, has pointed out in his report for the LSE Middle East Centre, appropriately entitled ‘Just Below the Surface’, Israel has a representative in Abu Dhabi, accredited to the International Renewable Energy Agency – rather than being accorded recognition by the Emirates administration itself.
In addition, the appointment of Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) as crown prince of Saudi Arabia in June 2017 has seen a further marginalisation of the Palestinians’ position and more open contacts with Israel. MbS represents a new generation which is more distant from the emotions of the Israel-Palestine conflict – a new generation which challenges the rigidity of the religious establishment in Riyadh which theologically regards Israel as a poisonous weed, growing on Muslim land.
Israel has sold security apparatus to Gulf states – often through third parties. However while surveillance equipment was cleared by Israel’s Defence Export Controls Agency, it appears that purchasers in the region have often used these apps, not only to eavesdrop on potential terrorists, but also to track dissidents and human rights activists.
The Herzilya-based NSO Group provides Pegasus spyware which allow for the remote surveillance of mobile smartphones. There have been press reports that such software was utilised in the tracking of the journalist, Jamal Koshoggi, murdered in the Saudi embassy in Istanbul.
The killing was attributed to MbS’s close aides – one of whom, Saud al-Qatani, according to the Wall Street Journal, was alleged to have visited Israel. While five of the Saudi hit squad have been given death sentences, these senior aides remain untouchable.
Just a few weeks ago, it was revealed that the smartphones of senior Pakistani officials as well as civil society figures in India have apparently been tapped. Significantly WhatsApp has recently filed to sue NSO in a San Francisco court.
The maverick Qataris have earned the ire of Saudi Arabia and the Emeratis by retaining good relations with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and supporting the activists of the Arab Spring – using Al Jazeera to antagonise virtually every state in the Arab world while avoiding any criticism of Qatar itself. At the same time, it has allowed the US to maintain a base at al Udeid outside Doha due to the Saudi refusal to do so.
Such Qatari manoeuvres often appear contradictory, but they are designed to solely preserve the state’s freedom of action. Its relationship with Hamas has allowed it to intervene to secure the release of Israelis held in Gaza. In addition, they have – with Israeli approval – provided funds for public employees and needy families in Gaza. In so doing, Gaza has not exploded despite the ongoing Israeli state of siege.
The relationship between Israel and the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia is an ongoing saga with almost certain future surprises – a remarkable development in the growing rapprochement between the Jewish state and the Arab world.