In a fascinating piece on the recent presidential elections in France, French political analyst Michel Gurfinkiel contrasted the fortunes of left and right in the 18th and 17th districts in the north of Paris. The 18th voted overwhelmingly for the left; the 17th for the right.
With no significant socio-economic differences, what could explain such radically contrasting voting patterns? The answer, Gurfinkiel said, was the distinct "ethnic and cultural" make-up of the two areas. In other words, the 18th district is mostly Muslim and "neo-French"; the 17th is not.
Recognition of the alliance between political Islam and the ideological left is not new, of course. It was gestating as far back as the 1960s when writers such as Herbert Marcuse sought to harness the revolutionary potential of third world movements that the Western proletariat had so conspicuously failed to provide.
Following the end of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11, it became clear that the anti-Western ideology par excellence was going to be Islamism. With more than a billion potential adherents, this was a force to be reckoned with. And if the price of the alliance was dropping or de-prioritising support for the rights of women, gays and, of course, the state of Israel and Jews in general, then so be it.
