The Trump ‘plan’ is immoral and could ignite the region

This article is part of a series on the Trump proposals. For two different views, see here and here

On February 4, 2025, the US president threw a strange idea into public discussion – an idea, not a plan. Just as Alexander the Great cut the “Gordian Knot” with his sword when wise men failed to untie it, Donald Trump presents a “solution to the Palestinian issue” by disregarding moral and legal constraints that have become accepted norms in the existing world order, while completely ignoring the historical, ethnic, religious, cultural and national factors that are an inseparable part of conflicts in the Middle East.

The “solution” presented by Trump might seem appropriate in a reality where “we have tried everything and failed”. One could even justify a policy that begins with introducing an idea that seems strange and illogical in order to unsettle all players and force them to consider a new approach. However, there are consequences for placing the idea on the table.

In a media event lasting less than an hour, the US president managed to shift the Palestinian issue from being a humanitarian disaster to a national security threat for Jordan and Egypt. He cast doubt on the status and stability of the Saudi kingdom. He delivered a PR boost to states supporting Hamas and deadly terrorism. He reinforced messianic nationalism in Israel and the global jihadist organisations in the region, for whom chaos serves as fertile ground for growth. And along the way, he cast doubt on the continued return of the hostages – a process that Hamas suspended on Tuesday.

The response from regional leaders was immediate. About an hour after Trump’s media event in Washington, in which he announced that Saudi Arabia does not demand the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Saudi foreign minister issued a statement in “non-diplomatic” (unequivocal) language on behalf of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, declaring that without the establishment of a Palestinian state, diplomatic relations with Israel will not be established.

His statement clarifies the shift in Saudi Arabia’s position, as well as that of all regional states, following October 7, 2023. In the “old era”, when the Abraham Accords were signed, diplomatic relations could be established while ignoring the “Palestinian issue”. The war in Gaza has changed their stance, and Trump’s performance last week has turned the Palestinian issue into a non-negotiable condition.

As for Jordan, where two-thirds of its citizens are already Palestinian, the migration of hundreds of thousands more Palestinians would mean a demographic earthquake that would disrupt the delicate balance maintained through their citizenship and integration into senior government positions, potentially leading to the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty.

Jordan's security doctrine now faces a critical test of its three fundamental principles. Those are, first, opposition to the notion of Jordan as part of the Palestinian state (a concept endorsed by the Israeli right). Second, rejection of the transfer of the Palestinian population to Jordan, as was done after the War of Independence in 1948 and after the Six-Day War in 1967. Third, unwavering support for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in accordance with UN and Security Council resolutions.

Last week, a public discussion began in the Jordanian media – Al-Quds Al-Arabi on February 8 – about a scenario that requires preparation for war with Israel.

If Trump’s idea were to become reality, one cannot ignore the scenario of a military front opening against Israel along a 300km border with Jordan, a country currently considered an ally and a key player in stopping Iranian missile attacks in April and October of last year.

In Egypt, the arrival in Sinai of thousands of Hamas operatives, some trained in Iran and battle-hardened after decades of fighting Israel, would undermine the Egyptian army’s ability to control the peninsula and prevent the transfer of weapons and ammunition.

Like Jordan, Egypt could become a confrontation state – further erasing the primary achievement of the war: dismantling the “Axis of Evil” that Iran built around Israel.

The initial response in Israel is divided between those who fear the event’s impact on the suspended hostage negotiations – since without their return, victory in the war cannot be declared – and those who see the required release of senior Palestinian terrorists in exchange as a surrender, prioritising the survival of the right-wing government above all.

The initial shock has diverted public discussions from the implications of the proposed transfer of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, allegedly "for their own good." Minister Smotrich’s statement, “This is just the beginning”, referring to the evacuation of residents, aligns with ideas that have accompanied the Israeli right for many years. It is the clearest expression of the far-right’s belief that war creates an opportunity to redraw borders and forcibly remove populations. The faith in divine intervention to secure “Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel” means that Trump’s transfer proposal fits into a broader political vision – shifting from military occupation for security reasons to annexation and sovereignty declaration (see Smotrich’s 2018 Decisive Plan).

As for the Palestinians, the gap between Mahmoud Abbas, who rushed to meet with King Abdullah to coordinate political opposition to the transfer idea, and Hamas gunmen appearing on TV in Gaza highlights the deep rift in Palestinian society regarding the future each side envisions.

In the new reality created on October 7, 2023, the assumptions that led to the Abraham Accords have collided with the hard rock of Palestinian national existence. The firm stance of the Group of Five – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Emirates and Qatar backed by the Arab League and the PLO - rejecting expulsion from Gaza, opposing any political settlement without a Palestinian state and demanding the Palestinian Authority’s involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction marks regional opposition to Trump’s ideas.

At the end of the day, the decisions will be made in Riyadh and Washington. The likelihood of Trump’s proposal materialising is close to zero.

Egypt and Jordan will not jeopardise their national security. Saudi Arabia, which was the initiator of the Arab Peace Plan, will not forfeit its political and religious leadership in the region. And even in Washington, the weakening of U.S. influence in the Middle East would be seen as unacceptable.

The immediate consequence, however, is the danger to the second phase of the hostage deal. For me personally, and for most Israelis, leaving them behind would mean abandoning them by the government.

The implications for mutual responsibility – a core value uniting the Israeli majority – would be dramatic.

Once the dust settles and the consequences become clear, there will always be the option to return to the Biden Doctrine, which combines firm opposition to Iran, diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the promotion of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. President Trump has all the tools to steer the Middle East in Biden’s direction. After all, he already executed Biden’s initiative to secure the release of the hostages.

The cruel irony of history could create a scenario in which Trump is ultimately remembered as the peacemaker who fulfilled the vision of his predecessors.

The greatest risk in terms of Israeli politics is that Trump’s backing of Netanyahu will accelerate annexation steps in the West Bank and encourage those on the political far right in their treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Will these possibilities serve as a “wake-up call” for the majority of Israelis? I believe that the dedication of the Israeli people who took to the streets to fight for Israel’s democratic identity, will ensure that the nation continues to thrive as a Jewish and democratic state.

Admiral (ret) Ami Ayalon is a former head of the Shin Bet and former commander-in-chief of the Navy