On August 14, 2006, when the ceasefire with Hezbollah took effect ending the Second Lebanon War, a group of IDF reservists set up a tent camp in the Rose Garden opposite the prime minister’s office in Jerusalem. The soldiers were upset and disillusioned by the way the war had been managed from the very start. The constant shifting of orders, the outdated and inadequate equipment they had been provided to fight with, and the lack of clear strategy contributed to their frustration.
Initially, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert sought to quell their anger by establishing a government commission of inquiry. Though it is a largely forgotten chapter in the war, Olmert appointed Nahum Admoni, a former head of Mossad, to review the political management of the war, examining how the government functioned and made decisions. The idea was to get a clear picture of the decision-making processes and assess whether government had failed.
Ultimately though, the Admoni committee was short-lived. The reservists were not satisfied with the decision to have a government commission of inquiry and by mid-September, under intense pressure, Olmert cancelled the move and appointed a state commission of inquiry to look into the war. It was known as the Winograd Commission, named after the former judge who headed it.
This development would have lasting consequences for Israel’s political landscape. Dan Halutz, the IDF chief of staff at the time, stepped down from his position after the commission was established; Amir Peretz, the defence minister, faced a humiliating defeat in the Labor Party primaries and was replaced by Ehud Barak. While Olmert managed to stay in power for another two years, the political damage had been done. His resignation came at the end of 2008, a direct result of the political fallout stemming from the Winograd Commission’s findings.
This history is particularly relevant today as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces growing pressure to establish a similar inquiry into the failures of October 7. It may be winding down, but the calls for accountability have only intensified. Netanyahu, however, has resisted establishing a state commission of inquiry.
Instead he has proposed creating a government committee, a move that has been met with widespread criticism. The opposition in the Knesset, along with the families of the victims of the October 7 attacks, believe that a government-run inquiry is insufficient. Most of the public agrees; according to polls, about 70 per cent of Israelis want an independent probe.
The reason is clear: a government committee, set up by the cabinet, lacks the independence necessary for an impartial investigation. The committee would be composed of members handpicked by the government itself, which means that the same individuals who are being scrutinised would have a say in selecting the people who are supposed to hold them accountable.
In contrast, a state commission of inquiry is designed to be independent. While it is also established by the cabinet, its members are appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, not the government. This ensures that the commission operates without political interference. Furthermore, the commission has broad powers to investigate and can issue personal recommendations for sanctions against any of the individuals investigated. This independence is crucial for ensuring that the investigation is seen as credible and trustworthy by the public.
Netanyahu, however, is hesitant to go down this route. He is aware of the political consequences that an inquiry of this nature could bring. He looks back at previous inquiries, such as the Winograd Commission, and knows that once the commission is set up and its members are appointed by the Supreme Court, he will lose control over the investigation. The process would no longer be under his direction and the findings could prove politically damaging.
This fear of losing control is not new. Despite being Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Netanyahu has never established a state commission of inquiry, not after the Meron disaster in 2021 when 45 people were killed in a stampede; nor after the Carmel Forest fires in 2010. Now, once again, he is resisting calls for an independent investigation.
Netanyahu’s strategy is a combination of stalling for time while offering alternative forms of inquiry to placate the public. By doing so, he hopes to avoid the political fallout from a full-fledged inquiry.
The fact that more than 15 months have already passed since the war began is one part of his plan since, historically, commissions of inquiry have been set up soon after the event they are investigating. The Agranat Commission, for example, was formed just 27 days after the Yom Kippur War ended; the Shamgar Commission, which investigated the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was formed just four days after the tragedy; and the Winograd Commission was created about a month after the end of the Second Lebanon War.
In addition to delaying the establishment of an inquiry, Netanyahu’s coalition has proposed an alternative solution. The Likud Party has submitted a bill that would create a political probe into the war, composed of six members selected by the Knesset. Two chairpersons would be appointed, with the coalition and the opposition each selecting three members. The bill also stipulates that no other investigations into the events of October 7 or the actions of the day would be permitted.
While the bill offers the opposition a place at the table, it has been rejected by those who demand a truly independent panel. They insist that a government-controlled inquiry will be inherently biased and will lack the transparency necessary for a fair investigation.
This demand for an independent panel is understandable, but it’s important to recognise that in Israel’s current political climate, achieving such independence is almost impossible. If a state commission were established and the Supreme Court appointed members, the investigation would be viewed by half the country as politically motivated.
This challenge is not one that can be easily solved but it is one that must be addressed. As the war with Gaza draws to a close, and as more hostages return home, Israel needs to launch a comprehensive investigation into what led to this conflict.
The lessons also need to go beyond simply holding individuals accountable, even though that is certainly a worthy objective. It is equally important to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated since only by understanding what went wrong, can Israel prevent similar failures in the future. This is not just about accountability – it is about protecting the future of the State of Israel.
