Thos of us who have highlighted some of the views of Ken Livingstone’s friend, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, are often told we are distorting what he says, or taking the words out of context. So this review in Democratiya by Dave Rich and Mark Gardner of a new translation of al-Qaradawi’s book Fatawa on Palestine is essential reading. It considers his words, in his official translation.
As they write:
It is a book that promises a battle 'between the collective body of Muslims and the collective body of Jews i.e. all Muslims and all Jews' (p.77), which will hasten the end of days for mankind. This is no political analysis of the Israel/Palestine conflict, or even a faith-based lament for the Palestinian people; it is a passionate apocalyptic vision of division, war and final triumph.
Do read the whole review, because it is essential to understand just how malign an influence this man is, and how misguided – to be charitable – are those who support him and give him a platform. These are merely extracts; as I say, do read the whole review for the full story of this man's barbaric, destructive credo:
Qaradawi makes it clear at the beginning of the book that Israel should be removed entirely from what he sees as Muslim land. He discusses his hypothetical reaction to any future peace accord that would leave Israel in control of its pre-1967 territory in the opening chapter:
[T]he so-called peace accords involved recognizing the Jews' right to the usurped lands which means that Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, al-Ladd, Ramallah, Beir Sheba and even Jerusalem will be considered as Israeli lands. Such cities that have been part of the Muslim world for more than thirteen hundred years will become part of the Zionist Jewish state. Hence, we will never be able to claim them back and, after being taken by force, such places will be legitimately given to the enemy.
Bearing this in mind, we can realize that what happened was not a peace accord being signed; rather, it is an utter recognition of Israel having rights and sovereignty in our Arab Muslim lands. Therefore, we sign a witnessed agreement to lose such lands forever. (p. 3-4)
Nor, significantly, does Qaradawi feel that the Palestinians have the authority to make such a peace agreement with Israel:
I have always stressed that Palestine is a Muslim land belonging to all generations of the Muslim nation. Therefore, if any of these generations fail to defend and protect this land, it is for the following generations to stand up for this task. If Palestinians neglect their duty of defending this land, the whole Muslim nation is required to take this responsibility and defend the land either by force or word. (p. 5)
Hamas, as the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, has for many years looked to Qaradawi as a religious authority and relied upon his rulings. The idea that any peace deal made by the Palestinian leadership with Israel should be treated as null and void by successive generations of Palestinians, appears to be echoed in the refusal of the current Hamas government to recognise past agreements made with Israel by its predecessors. There are common principles and ideological positions that run through the policies of Hamas, the writings of Qaradawi and the wider vision of the Muslim Brotherhood.
...Qaradawi's classification of 'every Jew in the world' (p. 42) as an enemy may refer to contemporary events for its justification, but it has a deep theological purpose. A chapter of the book is devoted to a discussion of the hadith [a record of a saying or deed of Muhammad] that reads:
"The last day will not come unless you fight Jews. A Jew will hide himself behind stones and trees and stones and trees will say, 'O servant of Allah – or O Muslim – there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.'"
This hadith is used by many radical Islamist groups to incite conflict between Muslims and Jews. It is quoted in article seven of the Hamas Covenant and its use in the literature of Hizb ut-Tahrir was one of the reasons why that organisation was banned by the National Union of Students. Qaradawi refers to the hadith as 'one of the miracles of our Prophet' (p. 76) and then goes on to describe how this battle between Muslims and Jews is one of the preconditions that needs to be fulfilled before the Day of Judgement can come. He carefully explains, though, that the current fighting between Israel and the Palestinians is a start, but is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the hadith:
[W]e believe that the battle between us and the Jews is coming … Such a battle is not driven by nationalistic causes or patriotic belonging; it is rather driven by religious incentives. This battle is not going to happen between Arabs and Zionists, or between Jews and Palestinians, or between Jews or anybody else. It is between Muslims and Jews as is clearly stated in the hadith. This battle will occur between the collective body of Muslims and the collective body of Jews i.e. all Muslims and all Jews. (p.77)
...The questioner might have thought that gaining victory over the Jews will be delayed till before the Day of Judgement, but there is no clear evidence to say this. We hope – Insha' Allah – that it shall happen soon. In fact, the introduction of such a victory has occurred and been embodied in the Islamic movement and the revolution of mosques against the oppressor and the occupier. It has also arisen in the activities of those children who carry stones in their hands to defend their lands, in the calls that are spreading everywhere telling Muslims that they have to return to Islam and apply it in every aspect of life. All this brings us nearer to victory and surely victory is near. (p.79)
Other Islamists share Qaradawi's messianic interpretation of current events. The Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPACUK) advertised a recent meeting in Manchester with the call:
If the leadership is entrusted to those unfit for it, expect the Hour. By Allah the signs of the end of times are all around us, a hundred million Zionists desire with all their hearts to plunge this world into the final battle, and all around the Muslims are betrayed and bewitched. Muslim Leaders in the Mosque concern themselves with the minor points of fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] while all around the Ummah cries in pain and fitna [division] and those with hatred in their hearts plan and plot. [2]
Qaradawi personifies the combination of theological anti-Judaism, modern European antisemitism and conflict-driven Judeophobia that make up contemporary Islamist attitudes to Jews.
...Fatawa on Palestine includes Qaradawi's standard line on Palestinian suicide bombing, which is now well known. Suicide bombings are, in Qaradawi's words, '[O]ne of the greatest types of Jihad … valid heroic martyrdom operations and very different from suicide.' (p. 6) The suicide bomber '[H]as sold his soul to Allah and placed his heart on gaining martyrdom and purchasing Paradise.' (p. 7) Women suicide bombers '[A]re doing a remarkable deed that is blessed by Almighty Allah and considered an act of Jihad for the sake of Allah.' (p. 21) Qaradawi condemned the suicide bombings in London on 7/7, but it does not appear that this was based on a principled objection to the methods or goals of the global jihadist movement. Qaradawi was one of the first and most consistent supporters of Hamas suicide bombings, when most other high-profile Sunni clerics refused to give the practice their consent. This alone should give pause for thought to those people who cite his condemnation of 9/11 and 7/7 as evidence of his moderation. His promotion of the theology and culture of martyrdom and his eschatological yearnings can only feed the ideology of global jihad. Condemnation of suicide bombings that target civilians should not be contingent on who the victims and perpetrators are, nor on whether the terrorism takes place in one country or another. Qaradawi's way around this is to redefine what a civilian is, by claiming that Israeli society 'is a military society in its totality.' (p. 7) This is not an argument that should be given any serious consideration, and serves only to dehumanise his enemy.
...Qaradawi's attitudes towards all other faith groups are dependent on how their beliefs and their behaviour sit within his own theological interpretations. Part of Qaradawi's political strategy is to build his influence within European Muslim communities by developing a religious framework to guide the lives of Muslim minorities in the West. His visit to London in 2004 was to hold a meeting of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, of which he is President. His focus on Europe is one reason why, in 2004, he turned down the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood when it was offered to him. It is possible to understand why some in the West see him as a potential ally against extremism. He supports democratic elections, for instance, and advises western banks on Islamic finance. This reflects the Muslim Brotherhood's historic openness to Western ideas and Qaradawi's personal pragmatism. On too many issues, though, his views appear inimical to modern European values. Those who are trying to build alliances against violent extremism need to choose their partners carefully, and in an informed way. British and European society should be inclusive, cohesive and diverse; it has no place for the conflict, bigotry and division of Fatawa on Palestine.
Part of Qaradawi's political strategy is to build his influence within European Muslim communities by developing a religious framework to guide the lives of Muslim minorities in the West. His visit to London in 2004 was to hold a meeting of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, of which he is President. His focus on Europe is one reason why, in 2004, he turned down the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood when it was offered to him. It is possible to understand why some in the West see him as a potential ally against extremism. He supports democratic elections, for instance, and advises western banks on Islamic finance. This reflects the Muslim Brotherhood's historic openness to Western ideas and Qaradawi's personal pragmatism. On too many issues, though, his views appear inimical to modern European values. Those who are trying to build alliances against violent extremism need to choose their partners carefully, and in an informed way. British and European society should be inclusive, cohesive and diverse; it has no place for the conflict, bigotry and division of Fatawa on Palestine.
Part of Qaradawi's political strategy is to build his influence within European Muslim communities by developing a religious framework to guide the lives of Muslim minorities in the West. His visit to London in 2004 was to hold a meeting of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, of which he is President. His focus on Europe is one reason why, in 2004, he turned down the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood when it was offered to him. It is possible to understand why some in the West see him as a potential ally against extremism. He supports democratic elections, for instance, and advises western banks on Islamic finance. This reflects the Muslim Brotherhood's historic openness to Western ideas and Qaradawi's personal pragmatism. On too many issues, though, his views appear inimical to modern European values. Those who are trying to build alliances against violent extremism need to choose their partners carefully, and in an informed way. British and European society should be inclusive, cohesive and diverse; it has no place for the conflict, bigotry and division of Fatawa on Palestine.
