The truth about the elimination of October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar

Only the following morning would IDF soldiers approach Sinwar’s partially buried corpse. Despite the shells that had nearly demolished his hiding place, his face remained relatively intact except for a large metal fragment that split his forehead.

His identity was immediately apparent. Lt. Col. R., the commander of the 450th Battalion, whose forces had killed Sinwar and his entire surrounding team, stood over the body that Sukkot morning, examining it carefully.

“At that moment, I thought primarily about the bereaved families and hostages,” he recounted. “I said to myself: ‘This is the mastermind behind everything, evil incarnate, and we killed him.'”

R. pulled his mobile phone from his vest, brought it to Sinwar’s pallid face, and captured an image that would become the closest thing to a victory photo the IDF achieved in this war. “No,” he said modestly. “I don’t consider it a victory photo. We haven’t won yet. But that will happen too.”

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar seeking safety in Gaza tunnel, according to footage released by IDF[Missing Credit]

‘The privilege of catching him’

While Sinwar’s death stands as one of the war’s most significant military achievements, circumstances fostered a narrative suggesting the encounter was merely accidental—that the 450th Battalion stumbled upon him among Rafah’s ruins and killed him without recognising his identity. This narrative, investigation reveals, substantially distorts reality.

Though the Hamas strongman was indeed slain with some element of luck, his death resulted from a determined, sophisticated operation that invested considerable resources and employed groundbreaking combat techniques.

These factors made possible the final scene in Tel al-Sultan, where he was forced to emerge from secure tunnels onto the surface, becoming vulnerable to the 450th Battalion’s soldiers. “Sinwar had been fleeing for a very long time,” the battalion commander explained. “We simply had the privilege of catching him during our shift.”

This investigation, based on conversations with IDF and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) sources alongside exclusive materials being published for the first time, traces the pursuit of Sinwar from the war’s outbreak until his death in Rafah a year later – revealing how the hunt progressed for the man who transformed the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.

Deep in the tunnel maze

From the war’s earliest moments, the Israeli Security Cabinet placed the elimination of the Hamas leadership – particularly Sinwar – as a central objective of the Gaza ground operation.

The intelligence mission naturally fell to the Shin Bet. “Targeted eliminations have always been their domain,” a security source explained. The agency, which had closely monitored Gaza’s terrorist leaders before October 7, attacked the mission zealously, partly to avenge the humiliation inflicted by Sinwar and his operatives.

Early in the conflict, the Shin Bet’s operations division established a specialised command centre gathering intelligence on the Hamas leadership.

Retrospective analysis revealed that Sinwar descended into tunnels beneath his Khan Yunis home on October 7, together with family members, and remained in proximity for months afterward. Sinwar likely remained in Khan Yunis until absolutely necessary because he believed the IDF wouldn’t attempt a ground operation in Gaza’s second-largest city.

Within Khan Yunis’s protected depths, Sinwar was accompanied not only by his wife and children but also by Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s “military” wing commander, who apparently relocated from Gaza City after October 7. Together with Rafah Salameh, Khan Yunis Brigade commander, this exclusive group of wanted men hid deep within the city’s extensive tunnel network.

While Sinwar’s command group continued managing both the fight against the IDF and hostage release negotiations from their hiding place, they maintained strict isolation and compartmentalisation protocols. Sinwar rarely employed electronic communication that might enable tracking, instead managing external contact primarily through trusted couriers.

The Shin Bet would have preferred deploying forces into Khan Yunis at the ground operation’s commencement, but the IDF’s operational plan began with northern Gaza Strip manoeuvres.

The physical pursuit of Sinwar had to wait.

IDF soldiers carry the corpse of Sinwar[Missing Credit]

The toughest nut to crack

Sinwar’s security was about to be shattered by the 98th Paratroopers Division, aka the Fire Formation. In November 2023, this elite division under Brig. Gen. (now Maj. Gen.) Dan Goldfus received the challenging mission of capturing Khan Yunis.

Previous military operations in northern Gaza had employed an outside-in approach, with forces advancing gradually from urban outskirts toward central targets. This methodology allowed many terrorists to escape before forces arrived.

The 98th Division implemented the reverse strategy: Its seven subordinate brigades received orders to move at maximum speed directly into central Khan Yunis, exploiting the element of surprise. Following this rapid advance, forces would quickly enter underground areas and secure tunnel entrances in the city’s heart.

The operational logic aimed to surprise Hamas leadership, trap them underground within a confined area, block all escape routes, and then methodically approach them through the tunnels.

But these plans collided with a profound intelligence gap. Since Khan Yunis hadn’t been prioritised by the IDF in pre-war planning (“no one imagined the IDF would manoeuvre there,” a military source explained), intelligence on the city’s tunnel network remained severely limited.

The division’s intelligence personnel worked frantically to narrow these knowledge gaps. Retrospective analysis would later reveal these gaps were substantial. The division was surprised to discover during operations that Hamas leadership had concealed themselves in relatively shallow tunnels approximately 15 metres (49 feet) deep, not the expected 60-70 metres (197-230 feet).

Further, they found the tunnels were nearly completely interconnected, enabling continuous movement throughout the underground network – another critical detail largely unknown to Israeli intelligence.

Despite incomplete intelligence and insufficient forces, the 98th Division pressed forward. Previously undisclosed details about the Khan Yunis campaign of December-February 2024 reveal a brilliant, persistent military operation featuring the IDF’s first comprehensive underground pursuit of Hamas’s entire leadership structure.

Hamas operatives typically fled without engaging – abandoning their underground complexes and escaping through connecting tunnels to adjacent sectors. During these retreats, they would detonate explosives to collapse tunnel segments behind them, protected by blast doors. These collapses delayed pursuing forces, allowing the operatives to escape repeatedly.

On one occasion, during the brief window between the IDF ground force’s withdrawal and Goldfuss underground team’s arrival, Sinwar, Deif and Salameh escaped the tunnel disguised as women. Forensic evidence collected later, along with surveillance footage, confirmed that they had indeed been there.

IDF troops discovered the underground complex shortly after the group’s escape and found Hamas leadership’s meal still set out on plates. “The coffee was still hot,” as division commander Goldfus later described to media.

Evidence from the abandoned complex, combined with additional intelligence flowing to command centres, indicated Sinwar was fleeing toward western Khan Yunis.

The Shin Bet accordingly redirected IDF operations in this direction. “This marked the point where Sinwar’s hourglass began running out,” a security source explained. “Until then, he had maintained a static position, minimizing opportunities for mistakes. But once you force him to move, he must improvise, inevitably leading to errors.”

A retrospective intelligence analysis revealed that around May 2024, Sinwar successfully escaped Khan Yunis and moved southward to neighbouring Rafah. At this stage, the IDF had not yet begun operations in Rafah, allowing Sinwar to return to the relative safety of its tunnel network.

Further intelligence indicated Sinwar arrived in Rafah without Deif. After their joint escape from the Khan Yunis house, the two men separated, with Deif remaining in Khan Yunis – possibly due to mobility limitations. Deif and brigade commander Salameh would remain in the city for several more months until their joint elimination by airstrike on July 13.

Intelligence increasingly confirmed Sinwar’s presence in Rafah, eventually narrowing focus to the Tel al-Sultan neighbourhood on the city’s northwestern outskirts.

By August, the IDF leadership had directed the 162nd Armored Division, aka the Steel Formation, to concentrate efforts on Tel al-Sultan’s tunnel network – smaller and less complex than Khan Yunis’s labyrinth.

The 162nd Division employed a fundamentally different approach than the 98th Division’s earlier “cat” and later “octopus” methods in Khan Yunis. The new “elephant method” involved massive force – using bulldozers and explosives to systematically destroy extensive tunnel sections, forcing Hamas operatives above ground.

This strategy gradually denied Hamas nearly all underground movement in Tel al-Sultan, leaving Sinwar and his small security detail no choice but to venture onto the surface.

Footage broadcast on Al Jazeera shows Sinwar during August-September 2024 moving through Tel al-Sultan’s rubble-strewn landscape. These images capture him in civilian clothes, using a walking stick, and wrapped in a camouflage blanket.

Following these developments and the near-complete destruction of Tel al-Sultan’s underground infrastructure, IDF leadership considered the Rafah operation largely complete.

However, Shin Bet officials worried that completely withdrawing from the neighbourhood would allow Sinwar to escape, likely to Khan Yunis. “This prompted the Shin Bet’s insistence on maintaining presence in the area,” a security source explained.

The IDF leadership ultimately decided that the 162nd Division would withdraw from Rafah, but the city wouldn’t be completely evacuated. Instead, forces from the 143rd “Fire Fox” Division, also known as the Gaza Division, would maintain a presence there. Division commander Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram committed to continuing offensive operations, focusing on Tel al-Sultan.

The specific unit deployed to Tel al-Sultan was the 450th Battalion. Its commander R. led three companies: Kfir infantry, paratroopers under Shreibman, and a tank company from the 460th Armored Brigade’s 198th Battalion.

Shreibman’s paratroopers company received orders to secure a building code-named “the Red House,” which offered strategic observation over the area.

At first light on October 17, forces examining the slain combatant’s body discovered that it was Yahya Sinwar. “This marked the first mention of Sinwar’s name throughout the entire operation,” R. noted.

When asked if they received any recognition for killing Sinwar, R. answered plainly: “No. Our persistence produced the result, but we weren’t the only ones. The pursuit of Sinwar was extensive – we simply fired the final bullet.”

Originally published by Israel Hayom.