Sports scientists and coaches often discuss fine margins — those small changes that make the difference between success and failure.
Polling numbers have consistently shown little difference between those who support Benjamin Netanyahu and those who oppose him. The Netanyahu bloc — including Likud, the far-right Religious Zionist party and two strictly-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism — has been polling at 59-61 seats.
Yet the devil is in the details or, in this case, in the 3-4 per cent margin of error. The difference between 59 and 61 is immense — the former represents abject failure (again); the latter a famous victory. Once again, fine margins in three key areas will likely determine the result.
The Threshold Question
In March 2014, the Knesset raised the electoral threshold from 2 to 3.25 per cent, thus significantly increasing how many votes each party needed to gain seats.
In 2013, this number was approximately 75,800 votes. In 2015 it was 123,500 votes. In 2019, when Naftali Bennett’s party came agonisingly close, it was 140,000.
The larger threshold may play an oversized role in this election. Israeli-Arab party Balad, which pushes a Palestinian-nationalist agenda, will almost certainly fall below it — it has support from an estimated 40,000-80,000. Ayelet Shaked’s Jewish Home party is also consistently polling below the threshold.
The Knesset building in Jerusalem (Photo: Flash 90)
This in turn has created a vicious circle that disincentivises voters from considering her. After all, why potentially waste a vote?
A raft of other parties are polling above the threshold but too close for comfort. If polls are to be believed, Arab parties Ra’am and Hadash-Taal, left-wing Meretz and Labour, and right-wing Yisrael Beitenu should be fine come election day. But it needs only a few tens of thousands of voters to switch allegiance, and one or more may find themselves out of the Knesset.
With all these parties in the anti-Netanyahu camp, any such shock would strengthen Likud’s chances of forming the next government.
Turnout in the Arab community
A related issue to the threshold question is voter turnout in the Arab community. A correlation generally exists between turnout and the extent to which the four main Arab parties — Hadash, Ta’al, Ra’am and Balad — run on a united slate.
For example, in the elections of March 2015, September 2019 and March 2020, when the Joint List comprised all four parties, turnout was 63.5 per cent, 59.2 per cent and 64.8 per cent. In the elections of April 2019 and March 2021, when Arab parties ran in two separate lists, it was 49.2 per cent and approximately 45 per cent. For the first time since 2013, this election sees three separate lists — Hadash-Ta’al, Ra’am and Balad.
Low voter turnout coupled with three separate lists could be disastrous for Arab representation and constitute a boon to Mr Netanyahu getting to 61. One expert has warned that a turnout of under 42 per cent would lead to no Arab parties in the next Knesset.
Turnout is not just influenced by Arab parties displaying unity. It will also relate to how the community perceives Mansour Abbas’ decision to join the Bennett-Lapid government.
That historic move helped pave the way for a budget for the Arab community totalling NIS 30 billion (£7.5 billion), which aimed to address healthcare, social welfare and education as well as over NIS 2.5 billion (£625,000) to fight violence and organised crime. Yet with the government’s early collapse much of the money is yet to reach its target.
How will Mr Abbas’s move be seen — as a sign that greater political cooperation with the Jewish majority is beneficial, or that even when Arab parties engage with the mainstream it makes little practical difference?
Leading expert on Jewish-Arab relations Mohammed Darawshe told me that around 25 per cent of the Arab public never vote, some due to apathy and others due to ideological opposition to the Jewish state.
The remainder sway between voting and not, believing it will make no difference. Yet the ratio between these two latter groups is key — it can range from anything between 65 per cent against 10 per cent during high turnout to 40 per cent v 35 per cent in lower ones. The decision by this group between voting and staying at home in frustration will determine whether Mr Netanyahu returns to power. Key to this decision will be their position on Mr Abbas’ gamble.
Right-wingers without a home
In the March 2020 elections, more than 1.35 million Israelis cast a ballot for Likud, which gave the party 36 seats and almost 30 per cent of the total votes.
Yet a year later — after perceived mismanagement of the pandemic, an increasingly aggressive discourse within Likud coupled with Mr Netanyahu’s inability to pass the budget and failure to honour his rotation agreement with Benny Gantz — they received 300,000 fewer votes, losing seven seats.
Where did these Likud voters go? Some likely made their way to former popular Likud MK Gideon Saar, who ran on a right-wing but anti-Netanyahu ticket. Some may have gone to Mr Bennett, another right winger who called for Mr Netanyahu to be replaced.
Others simply stayed at home. Eighteen months on, the political party chosen by these former Netanyahu supporters (as well as the 225,000 who voted for Mr Bennett’s Yamina) will be critical.
But none of their prospective choices are ideal. Mr Bennett is now taking time out from politics. Ms Shaked’s Jewish Home is polling below the threshold. The far-right Religious-Zionist party has a strong Kahanist component, which many former Bennett or Likud supporters might be loath to strengthen.
Best placed to sweep up the “right wing disillusioned with Netanyahu and Likud” crowd would have been Mr Saar. But his union with Mr Gantz’s Blue and White party — intended to create a statesmanly right-wing party with strong security credentials — has given their list a leftist hue that some right wingers find off-putting.
On election night in March 2021, moments before the initial exit polls were published, TV announcers declared a “dramatic, decisive victory”.
It turned out to be the opposite of decisive — the blocs were tied, and political deadlock continued until the diverse and previously unimaginable Bennett-Lapid government was painstakingly fashioned.
Eighteen months on, it remains to be seen whether Mr Netanyahu or Mr Lapid (or even Mr Gantz) will win. In any event, it promises to be dramatic.
Calev Ben-Dor is Deputy Editor of Fathom, the journal of Bicom, where a longer version of this piece was published
