The Iranian regime is facing a devastating internal crisis

Rooted in the Middle Ages, incapable of answering the core demands of a hostile Iranian society for democracy and better life, the mullahs' regime has sustained itself by continuously stirring up crises in the region. Although it may momentarily scale back these tactics, abandoning this survival strategy is not an option.

To fend off internal crises, especially the wave of uprisings, the Iranian dictatorship has been fuelling conflict by providing financial, logistical and military support to Hamas.

Araghchi asserted regarding the Gaza war that “our foreign policy must be proactive. We must engage not only on the ground"—in the mullahs’ parlance, "on the ground" refers to activities like terrorism, chaos and warfare aimed at advancing specific policies — "but also in diplomacy. We must ensure that ceasefire negotiations do not proceed without considering Iran’s stance.”

The Iranian regime’s April 13 attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s retaliatory strike, both aimed at undermining each other’s deterrence capabilities, signals that the flames of this conflict are likely to engulf the Iranian regime itself.

Iran's parliamentary and presidential elections, boycotted by at least 90 per cent of the population, have sounded a dire warning for Khamenei, forcing him to reconsider some of his political strategies.

He is now focused on having sanctions lifted, even if only partially, to manage the internal super-crises plaguing the country, such as runaway inflation and the widespread poverty affecting more than two-thirds of the population. His aim is to prevent another uprising like those in 2017, 2019 and 2022. He is acutely aware that the next uprising could be even more devastating and could bring the regime’s downfall within sight.

Khamenei’s fear is rooted in the fact that, despite brutal repression, the Resistance Units affiliated with the MEK (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran), the regime’s sworn enemies, have significantly expanded and could mobilize the street power needed to overthrow the regime. It was largely due to these units that the elections were widely boycotted.

The death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May has thrown a wrench into Khamenei’s plans to purify and consolidate his government. Facing severe international and domestic isolation, the religious dictator has now allowed the so-called reformist Masoud Pezeshkian to run in the presidential elections. Khamenei’s strategy is twofold: first, to broaden the regime’s base by bringing the previously fractured “reformists” back into the fold, and second, to engage in negotiations with the United States during the American presidential election, aiming to have sanctions at least partially lifted.

Khamenei hopes that by doing so, he might be able to quell the deep dissatisfaction of the people, especially considering the more than 40% inflation and widespread poverty affecting over two-thirds of the population, along with other critical issues.

In 2021, there was an opportunity for a nuclear agreement during Rouhani’s presidency, but Khamenei thwarted it by pushing legislation through Parliament. The dictator is adamant about not losing the leverage provided by the nuclear facilities and enriched uranium; he has always wielded them like a Sword of Damocles over his dealings with Europe and the United States, using them as instruments of blackmail.

In the same interview, Araghchi reiterated, “The JCPOA, in its current form, is not revivable.” Nevertheless, the regime might be considering scaling back its 90 per cent uranium enrichment and even allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to secure some relief from sanctions, particularly as the U.S. elections approach, without fully relinquishing its nuclear ambitions.

The regime could easily resume enrichment at will. Since 1983, Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, spending possibly billions of dollars on the effort. Nuclear weapons are integral to the regime’s survival strategy. Iran seeks to negotiate over the Sword of Damocles it holds above its relations with Europe and the United States, aiming to extract concessions without ever fully laying down that sword.

Could Khamenei’s hesitation to carry out his threats of severe retaliation against Israel for the assassination in Tehran of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July be part of these tactical retreats to gain concessions?

The visit of Qatar’s Foreign Minister to Tehran on Aug. 26 lends credence to this suspicion.

However, even a tactical retreat by Khamenei is likely to exacerbate divisions at the top of the regime and, contrary to his intentions, could pave the way for another uprising, the very outcome the dictator is desperate to prevent.