One claim frequently heard from commentators and experts both within and outside Israel is that Jerusalem lacks a clear strategy and political plan for the day after the Iron Swords War.

They argue that while Israel may have achieved significant military gains in the north and in Gaza, Israel has no plan in place to translate those achievements into political arrangements that end the war and improve Israel’s security and international position.

These commentators consistently repeat the phrase well known to every first-year student of international relations, namely that the purpose of military action is to bring about an improved political situation, meaning there is no military solution without a concluding political leg (this has at least been true of most contemporary wars).

However, any implementation of a political arrangement that improves Israel’s security-political situation after October 7 will require military achievements and an end state that most of these commentators either refuse to accept or do not believe can be reached.

Until mid-September and the pager attack on Hezbollah —the first in a series of severe blows inflicted on the Iranian proxy group by Israel, including the elimination of most of its leadership — many insisted that Israel must end the war as soon as possible.

Their argument was based primarily on the need for an immediate hostage deal with Hamas in Gaza.

This is a legitimate need that stands on its own. It would not be the precursor to a dramatic strategic-political change that brings with it peace on the borders, normalisation with Saudi Arabia, improved relations with the United States and other desirable developments, as is erroneously claimed by many pundits and observers.

Those arguing against the expansion of the war into the north pointed out that in Gaza, Hamas has not been completely eliminated and is still tying up IDF forces.

There was therefore no possibility of opening another front against Hezbollah, which is a much stronger opponent.

However, contrary to these assessments, Israel reached a point in the Gaza campaign when it was able to shift its strategic attention and resources sufficiently to take aggressive action in Lebanon (indeed, it can be argued that it took Israel too long to reach this point in the campaign).

It appears that for the time being, Israel’s strategic patience has paid off, and most of its critics have been revealed as short-sighted. (It is worth noting that in most cases, these were the same people who warned against a ground operation in Gaza and insisted that Israel had no chance of operating in the Philadelphia Corridor or taking control of Rafah.)

Had Israel sought an arrangement in the days before it launched its campaign against Hezbollah, it would likely have received “shame and war together” in return, as Churchill famously put it.

Israel is now on the verge of a strategic turning point. It is in a position where it has restored its military superiority over Iran and its proxies.

We should of course not rush to celebrate while the campaign is still ongoing and the pendulum can still swing in any direction. At time of writing, we do not yet know what Israel’s response will be to the recent direct Iranian missile attack, what Iran’s response will be to the Israeli response, and so on.

What, then, are Israel’s strategic goals in the war, and how can they be translated into political goals?

As in any war, Israel has both explicitly defined, declared goals and implied, undeclared goals. It is essential to stress that in the Israeli view, this is an existential war. Post-October 7, Israel now understands that it can no longer allow hostile terrorist armies to exist on its borders waiting for the order to invade Israeli territory. When a war is existential, the goal is first to remove the threat and only then to clarify arrangements for “the day after.” This is not, after all, the American invasion of Iraq, a war that took place thousands of kilometres from US borders.

Here are Israel’s declared strategic and political goals:

In Gaza: 1) To eliminate Hamas’s military power and force the collapse of its rule, with the object of bringing about a situation in which there is no longer any security threat from the Gaza Strip; and 2) to create conditions for the return of the hostages.

In Lebanon: To return the residents of the Israeli north to their homes by destroying and pushing Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.

However, it appears there is also an undeclared goal for the overall campaign that takes a more comprehensive and long-term view: the creation of a new regional security reality.

Israel aims to dismantle the two Iranian proxies — Hamas and Hezbollah —that threatened it on its borders, creating a ring of fire that carried the threat of ground invasion.

Without these two proxies, Iran will be much weaker, and decades of investment are now going down the drain.

Considering Iran’s current economic state, it is doubtful that it will be able to reinvest in its proxies on the same scale.

In Gaza, the fight against remnants of Hamas, isolated terrorist cells that continue to operate, will go on for many months and perhaps even years.

The realistic goal is to hit Hamas hard enough that Gaza does not pose a greater threat than that posed by Palestinian terrorists in Judea and Samaria.

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other organisational cells are present and active in Judea and Samaria, but they do not pose a strategic threat.

Israel will have to reach a hostage deal and thereafter to “mow the lawn” in Gaza, as it is doing in Judea and Samaria, for the foreseeable future.

Israel is faced with an unresolved dilemma regarding Hamas’s control over humanitarian aid.

If Israel distributes the aid, it will become the de facto force ruling Gaza, which it does not want. But if it does not act on the matter, it allows Hamas to control both the aid and the population. A solution needs to be found to this quandary.

However, Gaza is a relatively small area, and Israel currently controls the exits and entrances.

It can gradually erode Hamas’s power, as the group is almost entirely unable to replenish its losses. Even the new fighters it is recruiting from the local population lack the knowledge and equipment of those the terror group has lost.

Hamas has been stripped of most of its military assets and will not be able to restock them under the conditions of the Israeli closure and continuing military pressure.

One can hope that at some point, Hamas will be weak enough that an agreement can be reached with a body or agency (or a combination thereof) that will manage the Strip and maintain law and order.

As of now, nobody other than the IDF will agree to confront the remnants of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, no Palestinian element is currently capable of committing to such an arrangement, even if it were willing to do so. (The Americans, who have spoken about the need for reform in the Palestinian Authority, are aware of this.)

The IDF understands that in Lebanon, unlike in Gaza, it is not possible to destroy most of the enemy’s forces.

It is, however, possible to hit Hezbollah extremely hard, as the IDF has already managed to do.

The IDF is capable of pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River and destroying its infrastructure, as well as severely damaging its long-range missile and rocket array.

The undeclared goal in Lebanon is to bring Hezbollah to the point where it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel and is unable to carry out the horror scenarios outlined before the current operation, which included a massive invasion of the Galilee and severe damage to army bases, critical infrastructure, ports, airports and so on.

From this point on, Israel’s test will be whether or not it can prevent Iran from rehabilitating Hezbollah.

Israel’s strategic achievement here (beyond returning the residents of the north) is breaking free from the equation of mutual deterrence that has paralysed it from acting against Hezbollah in Lebanon all these years.

This means Israel will have to expand the “campaign between the wars” that it has been conducting in Syria for 10 years.

It will now need to include Lebanon for the purpose of disrupting, delaying and perhaps even preventing Hezbollah’s build-up.

At some point, Israel may have to launch a broad preventive strike. Until then, Israel will gain a few years of quiet and rehabilitation of the north.

This scenario is based on Iran’s continuing as usual without any significant change. However, it is possible that Israel’s release from the grip of the Iranian proxies will allow it to focus more strategic attention on Iran.

This could lead to moves that weaken Iran and possibly even bring an end to the regime. If this occurs, Israel will be free to take some risks and break through to new arrangements in the Middle East.

Its partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and other countries, would also be free to promote agreements with Israel.

Other possibilities could open up for an accommodation with the Palestinians that both addresses the interests of both sides and has a chance of holding up.

Those familiar with the Cabinet discussions that were conducted during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 know that after the front lines were stabilised on October 8, there was great fear of a continued war of attrition in which Israel would be at a disadvantage.

The question facing the Cabinet was how to bring Syria and Egypt to want a ceasefire on terms favourable to Israel.

Initially, there was an unsuccessful attempt that included shelling Damascus and a ground advance that was eventually halted.

The Syrians were not impressed. Subsequently, the crossing of the Suez Canal plan matured, and the encirclement of and threat to destroy the Third Army led to an Egyptian request for a ceasefire on terms favourable to Israel.

Henry Kissinger, who thought Israel was seeking a ceasefire on October 11, was horrified by the thought that Israel would negotiate from a position of military weakness.

Israel is only one side in any set of political arrangements. It cannot dictate terms unilaterally.

Nor can it determine who the leaders will be on the opposing side. At most, it can perhaps determine who those leaders will not be, as it has done to Hezbollah’s leadership and to a significant part of Hamas’s.

Israel can ensure an improved military-security situation and hope conditions mature on the other side, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, to the point that agreements can be reached that are worth the paper they’re written on.

Israel does not control the internal political processes of the peoples surrounding it.

With that said, Israel is committed first and foremost to a military achievement that significantly improves its security situation and places the other side in a position of clear military inferiority, which would improve the chance of that side eventually coming to an agreement.

The Cabinet discussion of November 19, 1973, almost a month after the end of the Yom Kippur War, was recently published. Israel’s then-prime minister, Golda Meir, said, “Many things will be forgiven us, but one thing will not: weakness. The moment we are registered as weak, it’s over.”

In the same discussion, then-defence minister Moshe Dayan said, “Once we relied on the fact that we have deterrence power regarding the Arabs. I am very much afraid of a conception of us that we will be the deterred [party]—that we will fear confrontation with the Arabs and enter a psychosis of reverse deterrence.”

These words resonate strongly, even today.