Trump’s return is the Iran regime’s worst-case scenario, say analysts

“It’s clear they’re scared,” one former Trump administration official who worked on Middle East issues claimed to Politico. 

Kasra Aarabi, Director of IRGC Research at United Against Nuclear Iran, has argued that during his first term, Trump’s policies were a nightmare for the Iranian leadership – particularly for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his paramilitary force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In a recent analysis in the Telegraph, Aarabi outlined the serious challenges that a second Trump presidency would present for the Iranian regime.

One of the clearest signals of trouble for Iran lies in Trump’s unwavering promise to revive his previous “maximum pressure” campaign, which decimated the country’s economy and crippled the IRGC’s terror network.

During Trump’s first term, his decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions on Iran led to a dramatic drop in Iranian oil exports —one of the regime's key sources of revenue, Aarabi pointed out.

Aarabi added the “maximum pressure was highly effective,” as Iranian oil exports plummeted from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) to 200,000 bpd, significantly reducing the funds available to the IRGC’s terror proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups wreaking havoc in the Middle East.

Critics of the policy point out that in response, Tehran ramped up its nuclear activity and it is now enriching uranium close to weapons-grade level.

But Aarabi argues that the loss of these exports made it more difficult for the IRGC to fund its operations, and this, in turn, weakened its ability to project power abroad.

Under the Biden administration the US eased sanctions, allowing Iran to access billions of dollars in unfrozen assets and boosting its oil exports.

Aarabi highlights that the financial relief under the Biden administration allowed Iran to fund operations like the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. "When the US lifted the maximum pressure, Iran’s ability to finance its proxies returned," Aarabi notes.

However, he argues that Trump's return would immediately reverse this trend. “If Trump wins, expect a return to maximum pressure,” Aarabi asserts, “and Iran will once again be cut off from the financial resources it uses to fund terror.”

But the financial squeeze on Iran would only be the beginning of Trump’s strategy to dismantle Khamenei’s grip on power.

Aarabi suggests that a second Trump presidency would also restore US military deterrence in the region, a major element of his foreign policy.

On Trump’s selection of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, Jason Brodsky, policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran, observes that the news has not been well-received in Tehran. “I don’t think the Supreme Leader is sleeping easy,” Brodsky says, “and Iran is in for a rude awakening with President-elect Trump and his nominees”.

Trump’s previous military actions – such as the targeted killing of General Qassem Soleimani, the IRGC’s chief commander, in 2020 – sent a clear message to Khamenei, according to Aarabi. 

Aarabi also points out that Trump’s return could upend Iran’s relationship with Russia. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Khamenei has attempted to strengthen ties with Vladimir Putin, hoping to secure strategic backing.

But Trump, according to Aarabi, could be “the ultimate homewrecker in this Putin-Khamenei ‘love affair.’”

If Trump brokers a deal in Ukraine that satisfies Russia’s interests, Putin may no longer see Iran as a valuable ally. “History suggests that Putin is not known for loyalty,” Aarabi observes, “and Khamenei could quickly find himself abandoned.”

But the greatest challenge for Khamenei may lie in his domestic politics. Trump’s return could place Khamenei in a no-win situation. “The spectre of Trump’s return presents a difficult dilemma,” Aarabi explains. “Khamenei cannot afford to shake hands with the man who killed Soleimani.”

Soleimani was seen as a powerful figure in the regime, and any deal with Trump could alienate the hardliners who support Khamenei.

This division is made worse by rising protests and growing discontent among the Iranian people, who are turning more against the regime.

Aarabi believes that Trump’s economic pressure and strong military stance, combined with growing unrest inside Iran, could make Khamenei’s regime the weakest it has been in 45 years. “If Trump’s pressure is backed by support for the Iranian people,” Aarabi says, “by the end of his second term, Iran may no longer have a theocracy.”

Trump may not directly aim to overthrow the Iranian regime, but his actions, especially towards Iran, could end up weakening Khamenei’s rule. As Aarabi puts it, "For Trump, politics is personal," and with Khamenei having tried to have him assassinated over the past few years, the Iranian leader is likely to find himself on Trump's "revenge list."

Trita Parsi, co-founder of the noninterventionist Quincy Institute think tank in Washington, told NatSec Daily: “The Iranians have concluded, perhaps not openly, that they made a mistake during the Trump years.

“They rejected him for a variety of reasons. They didn’t know how to handle it, but it left Trump in a situation in which it became much easier for the Israelis, for the neocons, for the hawks, to convince Trump the only way to get a deal with the Iranians is that you have to sanction them to death.”