First Israeli report into Oct 7 published, detailing ‘one of the greatest failures in IDF history’

The Israel Defence Forces on Thursday presented its investigation into the catastrophic failures leading up to the October 7 Hamas-led massacre, which resulted in the deaths of over 1,300 Israelis and the abduction of 251 people.

The findings detail how Hamas, operating from the Gaza Strip, orchestrated a brutal attack that blindsided the IDF and left southern Israel in ruins.

Ordered by the Israeli military top brass, the report’s publication is likely to heap more pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a wider probe into potential political failings that led to the attack, which he has so far stalled several times.

It accompanies 41 individual investigations into specific incidents that took place on October 7 the results of which are due to be presented to communities affected by the violence in the coming weeks. The report concludes that the IDF "failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians".

Until the morning of October 7, Israel’s military considered Gaza a “secondary threat” as they were more focused on the threat from Hezbollah in the North and terrorist factions in the West Bank.

According to the IDF’s findings, on the morning of October 7, around 5,500 Hamas militants infiltrated Israeli territory in three waves, breaching the security fence through 114 points, utilising seven boats and six paragliders.

The first two waves, in which the majority of Israeli deaths occurred, comprised mostly highly-trained members of Hamas’s Al-Quds brigade, but the third contained other factions and Gazan civilians who ‘took advantage of the chaos’ to attack and kidnap Israeli civilians.

The IDF also acknowledged that some Israelis died in friendly fire incidents, but the report did not go into details about when or where this occurred. 

The terrorists and civilians were backed by a barrage of more than 4,000 rockets and 57 drones, overwhelming Israeli defences and creating chaos on a scale previously unseen from terrorists in Gaza. Israeli commanders on the ground were forced to use Google maps and civilian communications systems as Israeli bases were overwhelmed.

The report focused on four main topics: The development of the IDF’s “perceptions” of the Gaza Strip between 2018 and October 7, 2023; the intelligence and decision-making processes on the eve of the attack; battles during the first days of the war; and “additional focal points.”

Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi attends a wreath-laying ceremony marking Holocaust Remembrance Day (Picture: Getty)POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Investigation into the hours leading up to the massacre revealed that the first signs of an impending invasion were detected around 9pm on October 6, some nine-and-a-half hours before Hamas attacked. Despite this, no mitigating plans were made to cut off the attack by the Israeli army. 

Warning signs included preparations for mass rocket fire, operatives entering tunnels, and the activation of dozens of Israeli SIM cards inside the Strip.

The bases that were initially attacked by Hamas were operating with reduced personnel due to the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah. Hamas is believed to have picked this date for its assault, knowing that many reservists and soldiers would be with families and not on base.

One of the critical findings was the IDF’s misunderstanding of the severity of the attack on October 7.

“The State of Israel chose a policy of ‘conflict management’ vis-à-vis Hamas, whose purpose is to preserve and improve the existing reality, and from which the military methods of operation were derived,” the IDF charged in the probes, which were geared to draw operational lessons and not take aim at decisions by the political echelons.

“It is wrong to ‘manage’ a conflict with an enemy whose goal is your destruction,” the top-level military investigations stated on Thursday, concluding that Hamas terrorists “took advantage of Israel’s policy of ‘conflict management’ to advance an orderly plan for a broad attack.”

The detailed lessons-learned exercise found that the IDF’s Gaza division was “overwhelmed” for much of the day and that it took until approximately 12pm for any reinforcements to arrive on the scene.

“Far too many civilians died that morning, that day, asking in their hearts 'where is the IDF”? We completely understand that,” said a senior military official.

The investigation also paints a picture of the terror group’s preparation, which started as an idea of a mass attack to achieve “liberation” and was first decided upon in November 2016. By April 2022, Hamas had started planning its assault and was almost ready by September 2022.

By May 2023, the final plans for the attack on October 7 were set in motion, with Hamas deciding on the precise date months in advance. 

DF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi has taken responsibility for the military’s failures and plans to resign in March.

“The responsibility is mine. I was the commander of the army on October 7, and I also bear the full weight of your responsibility,” Halevi stated in an emotional address Thursday evening. “Every day since October 7, 2023, multiple times a day, I have forced myself to look failure in the eye. And I tell you, do not try to forget, do not try to look away—not from a place of weakness, but with great strength.”