Iran’s new President, Masoud Pezeshkian, met with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on October 11. The meeting is part of an Iranian charm offensive in recent years designed to cosy up to Moscow. This has also included practical initiatives that have had dangerous destabilising results. Iran has, for example, transferred its Shahed 136 drones to Russia and they have been used against Ukraine. The drones are the tip of the iceberg because Iran is also interested in other military-to-military relationships with Russia over ballistic missiles and other weaponry.

While the Iranian trade in drones to Russia hss helped Moscow against Ukraine, it appears Iran is now trying to call in favours with Russia regarding Iran’s multi-front war against Israel. On Sunday a Hezbollah drone struck an IDF training base in central Israel, killing four soldiers and wounding more than 60 others. This was the worst Hezbollah drone strike in 12 months of war. However, it follows a second deadly drone attack from Iraq that killed two IDF soldiers in the Golan earlier in October. In that incident more than 20 IDF soldiers were injured.

This deadly drone proliferation, to Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias, is part of the Iranians’ plan to create threats to Israel on multiple fronts. Iran mobilises proxies in multiple countries to do this. Recent evidence from documents found in Gaza also reveals that Hamas contacted Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to seek their support and coordination regarding the October 7 attack.

Why does this matter regarding Russia-Iran ties? Russia has grown closer to Iran and Russia welcomes Iran’s help regarding its war on Ukraine. Moscow is likely prepared to trade favours and turn the other way regarding Iran’s pushing Hezbollah into war with Israel. In addition, both Iran and Russia back the Assad regime in Syria. Iran uses Syria to move weapons to Hezbollah. Russia is therefore amicable when it comes to Hezbollah and Russia has also hosted Hamas in the year following the October 7 attack.

Moscow is increasingly part of the wider anti-Western alliance that backs Hamas (and Moscow’s war in Ukraine). The Russia-Iran axis is now key to this, and it poses an increasing threat Israel – to drag the Middle East into more wars.

Pezeshkian met Putin on the sidelines of an international conference, “Interconnection of Times and Civilisations – the Basis of Peace and Development”, which Iranian state media IRNA noted had convened in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan recently. “Pezeshkian expressed his satisfaction with the opportunity to meet with his Russian counterpart and added that the economic and cultural connections between the two countries are growing stronger,” IRNA reported. Iranian state media reports indicate that the trend of cooperation is “accelerating” between Tehran and Moscow. “Iran and Russia boast complementary capacities and can greatly support each other.”

The countries now want to create a “strategic partnership agreement” and work closely in other economic groupings that they are part of. This includes BRICS, the powerful group of countries that includes China, India, South America and Brazil. Increasingly China and Russia are both pursuing more partnerships in the Middle East, especially with Iran, in light of their existing work in BRICS. This desire for closer ties and sharing an anti-Western and therefore pro-Hamas and pro-Hezbollah world view is clear in both Iranian state media and Russian state media.

Russia’s TASS news agency’s report about the recent leaders’ meeting was headlined: “Russian, Iranian positions on international events very often close – Putin.”

It is now clear that what began as drone transfers to Russia, following Russia’s long-standing warm ties with Iran, is now causing a fire consuming parts of Lebanon – and which threatens Israel and the West. Any Russian backing for Iran could also include aiding its ballistic missile programme. As Iran continues its march toward a nuclear bomb, Tehran will want to weaponise the nuclear programme. This means testing a device and also creating the means to deliver a bomb via a long-range missile. The recent Iranian attack on Israel using 180 ballistic missiles is likely part of a larger dry-run for what Iran could do with nuclear weapons on those same missiles. Furthermore, it forms part of Iran’s increasingly aggressive behaviour and its willingness to confront Israel directly.

Iran’s threats to Israel go back many decades. Over the years it has slowly moved its proxies into position to carry out increasingly deadly attacks, such as the drone attacks from Iraq and Lebanon. As Iran cements its ties with Moscow it is further expanding its role in the Middle East – and also its ambitions to be more than a regional power. Iran wants to form closer ties with Russia – but also to enable those ties to be exploited by Moscow and to receive Russian support for Iran’s interests in return.

That means Russia no longer plays a balanced role in the region.

Any semblance of Russia helping with a two-state solution or peace can now be seen to have been thrown out the window.  Russia was part of the Quartet, established in 2002, that was supposed to advance peace along with the US, UN and EU.

Russia can no longer play a positive role if it is moving into the Iranian camp, open to backing Hamas massacres and Hezbollah’s destabilisation and warmongering.

Russia’s move in this direction is hardly a surprise considering its destruction of Ukraine. What is new is that Iran is rushing to cement stronger ties and wants more sharing of military technology and collaboration, such as backing for Hezbollah. Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows against Hezbollah began on September 23. Israel now faces increasing challenges in the war on Hezbollah. Russia’s tendency to side with Iran and increasingly bash Israel will make it harder for peace to be achieved in Lebanon, or for a ceasefire to be achieved on the multiple fronts that Israel is facing.

Seth J. Frantzman is the senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Post, an adjunct Fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024)