Opinion
Sinwar, check. Nasrallah, check. What comes next for Bibi and Israel?
If there was ever a moment ripe for launching the political process necessary to end the war, that moment is now
October 22, 2024 10:24
3 min read
If there was ever a moment ripe for launching the political process necessary to end the war, that moment is now
October 22, 2024 10:24It is difficult to overstate the military achievements Israel has racked up over the past two months.
From the remarkable pager attack against Hezbollah to the dismantling of its leadership – including the elimination of its devious and veteran leader Hassan Nasrallah – and the destruction of Hezbollah’s most advanced long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, the IDF has dealt significant blows. The degradation of the group’s infrastructure and tunnel networks in southern Lebanon has further underscored Israel’s operational success.
In Gaza, the situation is just as impressive, culminating in last week’s elimination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, coinciding with the ongoing offensive in northern Gaza, where the IDF remains committed to thwarting the terror group’s attempts to reconstitute itself.
After a year of war, if there was ever a moment ripe for launching the political process necessary to end the war – preferably with a deal for the hostages – that moment is now. Israel’s negotiation teams have been working feverishly since Sinwar’s elimination to restart talks that had stalled for months owing to the discord between Sinwar and Hamas’s leadership in Qatar. With Sinwar gone, there is a growing sense of optimism in Jerusalem that a breakthrough may be possible, and that whoever succeeds Sinwar will recognise that reaching a deal and ending the conflict is in his best interest.
From the outset, it was evident that a political plan would be needed to preserve the IDF’s hard-won gains on the battlefield. There is little doubt in Jerusalem that even after the war officially ends, the IDF will need to retain freedom to operate against Hamas, Hezbollah and their attempts to rebuild capabilities – whether in Gaza or along the northern border. The power vacuum left by the deaths of Sinwar and Nasrallah presents a unique opportunity for Israel and its allies to shape the future governance in Gaza and Lebanon. What those structures will look like remains uncertain, as Israel keeps its plans close to its chest, revealing little about the “day after” or which forces may be involved – Palestinian, Emirati, Saudi or something else.
Critics have sought to lay the blame for the hostages solely at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s feet but such claims are a gross exaggeration. The hostages are being held in tunnels beneath Gaza; for their release, Israel needs a partner on the other side willing to make a deal. As recently as last month, senior American officials stated unequivocally that it was not Netanyahu who was holding up a deal but Hamas, which consistently prevented negotiations. Israel, they noted, had made an effort to accommodate the terms of a potential swap.
While a hostage deal requires Hamas, planning a post-war Gaza does not. What is required is a governing entity willing to take responsibility for the Gaza Strip, managing civilian life, reconstruction, the distribution of aid, and basic law enforcement. This new authority will need to do all this while understanding that Israel will continue to target Hamas and its efforts to rebuild its military infrastructure.
Repeated Israeli incursions and airstrikes will undeniably pose challenges to the credibility of any new governing entity, which will have a hard time trying not to be seen as an Israeli puppet. However, that is the reality of the situation, and it underscores the need for close coordination between Israel and its allies.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah is weakening, the loss of its leadership and financial centres in the IAF strikes on Sunday night, creates an opening to free the country from Iran’s clutches. Achieving this requires a well-planned strategy. Will Israel push for a more robust United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War but failed to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding itself in southern Lebanon?
Or will it call for a more active role by France and the United States, with boots on the ground in Lebanon – not to protect Israel, but to give the Lebanese people a chance to restore their economy and heal their fractured society?
Regardless of the approach, coordination between Israel, the US, France and others is indispensable, as is the need for the IDF to continue operating in southern Lebanon and along the border to prevent the re-establishment of terrorist infrastructure.
This raises a crucial question: why does it appear that the bravery of the IDF in Gaza and Lebanon is not being matched by political courage in Jerusalem?
While signs suggest that dialogue is happening behind the scenes – US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was scheduled to visit Israel this week – the government must prioritise the nation’s needs over its own political calculations.
With the military successes in Gaza and Lebanon now is the time to roll out the day-after plans, which have the potential to pave the way for normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Could there be a more fitting outcome to this year than the promise of a brighter horizon for the region?