One of the most worrying aspects of Israel’s judicial reform crisis is how the division has affected the military and security services.
There is growing concern over three fundamental issues: cohesion and unity in the ranks, operational preparedness, and the erosion of deterrence from the vantage point of Israel’s enemies.
The prolonged crisis has exposed sharp dividing lines in the fabric of Israeli society and specifically security-civilian ties.
As readers will know, Israel prides itself on its people’s army. I served 20-plus years as a combat reservist and had the privilege of serving with Israelis from all walks of life — Jews, Druze and Bedouin — from across the country.
I can attest, from taking non-scientific anecdotal assessments this week, that my brothers and sisters in arms are significantly split.
This last week has seen these tensions exacerbating. Israeli media reported a harsh telephone exchange that took place last weekend between prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi.
Netanyahu apparently accused the latter of “damaging deterrence” by allowing the disunity in the army to spread, adding, “There’s a military here that has a country”. In turn, Halevi reportedly responded, “I can’t stand idly by when preparedness is being undermined.”
Both agree, therefore, that deterrence and preparedness are impacted, but dispute who is to blame.
The tension of “an army with a country” versus “a country with an army” is felt acutely in Israel, partly born from the lessons of Jewish history but also with the civilian population that doubles up as the army carrying the burden of protection.
On the one hand, some of those opposing the government’s agenda feel that military dissent is a legitimate tool to pressure a government ultimately beholden to a Jewish and democratic state; if that fundamental balance is altered, it marks a breach of the social contract.
On the other side are those who argue that the military needs to be kept above political disputes and that challenging the government’s legitimacy endangers the country’s security.
The issue was further intensified this week with the army taking in its latest batch of Israeli teenagers to begin their mandatory service. There was concern that anti-government parent protesters would influence and potentially weaken their kids’ obligation to serve.
This does not seem to be the case, with one piece of positive data, despite the crisis, in that there was no recorded drop in new recruits’ motivation to serve in combat roles.
Yoav Gallant (Photo: Getty Images)
On Sunday, Netanyahu met Halevi and other senior general staff officers in an effort to clear the air. Following that meeting, Netanyahu calibrated a slight softening of his language, as he refrained from using the loaded term “refusal”.
Instead, he “rejected the trend of conditional military service”. This is a more accurate expression that categorises the predicament of many air force pilots and others who volunteer their continued service.
On Tuesday, in a further effort at rapprochement, Netanyahu and his defence minister Yoav Gallant released a joint statement saying that they are “working together in close cooperation and give full backing to the IDF chief of staff and to the officers of the IDF in order to ensure the security of the state and its citizens.”
The controversy touches not only on the army’s preparedness, but also the optics of the debate: should this be a transparent issue and a reasonable topic for public discourse or is public interest and safety better served by keeping the details behind closed doors?
As representatives of a “people’s army”, is the responsibility of serving officers to air their concerns privately through the chain of command, or is it their duty to share them more widely with the general public?
Israel’s deterrence has traditionally been viewed as being based on a combination of four factors: the might of the IDF, Israel’s strong ties with and support from the US, Israel’s civilian fortitude, and the country’s economic strength.
There is a real concern that all these have been damaged over the last eight months and that Israel’s enemies are growing emboldened as a result.
This week saw further bellicose rhetoric from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, as well as further provocations on the Lebanon border.
Nasrallah took the opportunity of marking the anniversary of the end of the second Lebanon war to threaten to return Israel to the stone age — the same language with which Gallant had threatened Hezbollah the week before.
These might appear almost childlike taunts, were the stakes not so high. In addition, we have seen more signs of growing coordination between Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups, all under the malicious auspices of Iran.
In terms of the preparedness of the military, the working assumption is that the IDF has not been significantly inhibited operationally — yet. However, the next month could be crucial. Many key air force reservists booked travel in advance and did not train during August.
The test will be next month: do they return, or will enough stay away, constricting the operational agenda of their commanders? The same calculation will be made in other elite units.
Netanyahu faces a recurring dilemma, and his own Likud party appears divided. Some Likudniks argue that in light of the judicial controversy, the government has lost sight of two of its primary objectives: combatting the Iranian threat and reaching a normalisation agreement with Saudi Arabia.
As Netanyahu has recently told various US media, further judicial reforms will only advance with a consensus.
However, there is another strand within the party, led by justice minister Yariv Levin and with the backing of the hard-right coalition partners, that seeks to use its parliamentary majority to continue to advance a “full-on” right-wing agenda, including further judicial reforms.
Netanyahu faces a choice between forging consensus and lowering the tension versus angering his political base and possibly jeopardising his government’s survival.
Netanyahu’s dilemma also extends to Gallant, who finds himself similarly squeezed: should he voice the military’s concerns within the government or impose the government’s stance on the army?
Having survived a drama in March, when he was sacked, then reinstated, speculation is rife how long he can remain in the role.
TOXIC SELL-OUT
Alongside the reforms, the strictly Orthodox parties are seeking to ratchet up the pressure on the prime minister to honour his commitments in the coalition agreements to formalise the strictly Orthodox avoidance of military service.
Conscious of the toxicity of this sell-out among large swathes of the public, some Likud parliamentarians are already briefing privately that they cannot support such a move.
Netanyahu will soon be forced into a decision. There is even speculation that he and Levin have agreed to pause the judicial reforms for a year to focus on the passage of the strictly Orthodox draft bill.
This could prove just as divisive as the judicial reforms, and compound national division and civil strife.
Richard Pater is the chief executive of BICOM and a political analyst based in Jerusalem