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Opinion

My history of post-War British Jewry is consciously unorthodox

I have engaged with those who have lived at the edges of the Jewish community

January 27, 2025 15:33
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Luciana Berger addresses the crowd during a demonstration in Parliament Square against antisemitism in the Labour Party on March 26, 2018 (Getty Images)
7 min read

In the postwar period, the British-Jewish community assumed a significance in terms of world Jewry that it did not have prior to the Holocaust. After the murder of six million Jews across the Channel, Britain’s modest community of 400,000 people found itself (for twenty years) the largest in Europe, a reality that thrust British Jewish society into the international limelight as a global hub of Jewish life. As Moshe Davis, from Hebrew University, explained to a 1962 conference on Jewish life in Britain, ‘the British Jewish community stands out, by the will of God – as a brand maintained whole after its plucking from the fire’. In the immediate aftermath of the War, British Jewry also assumed an importance on the global Jewish stage as interlocutors between the British government and the Jewish refugees headed for the mandate territory of Palestine. British Jews challenged and fought British restrictions on immigration to Palestine at home and abroad, but they also represented Britain in its government, its military, its polity.

These British Jews lived in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty about the relevance of religious practice. Just as Christian religious practice fell into decline from the late 1950s onwards, so too British Judaism experienced a similar turn away from at least some forms of traditional religiosity. This turn threw up big questions for the growing number of non-or-minimally-practising Jews who instinctively saw (or thought they should see) on-going value in their Jewishness but didn’t really know what to do with it. In a controversial article in the New Statesman in 1965, journalist Bernard Levin questioned the relevance of Judaism in a secular age, asking whether modernity had ‘entirely dissolved…the word Jew’, and concluding that his own practice had indeed ‘ceased to have any meaning’ at all. The numerous responses to Levin, and the anger which his piece undoubtedly caused, suggested that he had touched a nerve. One reply highlighted the horrors of antisemitism as a reason why Levin was not right to even pose a question about the on-going relevance of Judaism. ‘There is a simple and irrefutable answer to Mr Bernard Levin’s tragic (and ridiculous) dilemma: Am I a Jew? He can ask himself what Hitler would have thought’. Yet, Levin’s dilemma was far from his alone, instead reflecting a broader current of uncertainty about secularism and its impact on the old faith.

Many within Britain’s postwar Jewish community were worried about Jews and Jewishness disappearing, both fearful of another Holocaust but also mindful of drifting into the sea of humanity, diluted beyond recognition into other populations and peoples. The first of these concerns had an extraordinarily wide impact. The legacy of the Holocaust, and a ‘never again’ mentality, loomed large in British-Jewish thinking. In the postwar, Jewish communities latched quickly onto threats against fellow Jews at home and abroad. My book explores the ways in which British Jews speedily mobilised in support of the State of Israel in 1967 and 1973 and were similarly determined to help other international Jewish communities under attack (thus the sustained support for Soviet Jewish Refuseniks in the 1970s and 1980s). These actions were rooted in solidarity, but also in Holocaust-informed guilt and fear. In this atmosphere, threats against Jewry seemed to Jewish communities to be the norm, which justified in-and-of-themselves (as shown in the responses to Levin) the point of being Jewish.