Masoud Pezeshkian, the so-called “reformist”, will be sworn in as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s president on Sunday. His presidency runs against the pattern of ideological “purification” that supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been spearheading in the past five years. So what changed Khamenei’s mind?

Pezeshkian’s presidency will not change the regime’s key policies. They are set by the supreme leader, who wields absolute power. The presidency is a rubber stamp and the face of the regime abroad. Pezeshkian would not have become president without consent from Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). So why did they choose Pezeshkian?

First, the high chance of a Trump presidency. Khamenei and the IRGC know if Trump is elected, US policy will revert to “maximum pressure” against the regime. This almost brought the Islamic Republic to its knees during Trump’s first term. But they also know Europe has a high level of disdain for The Donald. Thus, they believe that the best way to undermine “maximum pressure” is to divide the US and Europe on Iran.

This is achievable with Pezeshkian. The so-called “moderate” narrative around him provides the regime with a mask of “reformism”. Pezeshkian is someone Europeans will gladly shake hands with. Much to Khamenei’s delight, senior EU official Enrique Mora has already RSVP’d his attendance at Pezeshkian’s inauguration, describing the inauguration of a “reformist president” as “an important thing”. Through Pezeshkian, Khamenei believes he’ll be able to divide Europe from the US on Iran, prevent action against IRGC in Europe – not least its designation as a terrorist organisation – reinvigorate the manufactured “hardliner-reformist” narrative and revive the Iran lobby, which has been dead since Iran’s 2022 anti-regime uprising.

In the short-term, Pezeshkian also provides the regime with the best chance to get more frozen assets released on the basis that the incumbent Democrats have made it clear they want a deal with Tehran. This could be a key lifeline prior to Trump.  But it’s not all about the Donald.

The second factor relates to undermining Iran’s anti-regime movement and international support for the Iranian people. Khamenei and the IRGC will have calculated that a Pezeshkian presidency and the veneer of “reform” would undermine momentum for a transatlantic policy that supports Iran’s people against the regime. When in 2017 the Iranian people popularised the slogan “reformist-hardliner, the game is over”, the regime and its lobby abroad began to lose their main line of defence on the world stage – the illusion that the Islamic Republic can be reformed. The appointment of hardline Ebrahim Raisi – the “Butcher of Tehran” – as president in 2021 almost entirely disarmed the Iran lobby abroad.

The absence of an active lobby in whitewashing the regime was felt in Tehran during Iran’s 2022 protests which, for the first time, saw world leaders engage with Iranian opposition figures and advocate support for the Iranian people’s democratic aspirations. This was in stark contrast to the silent international reaction to the November 2019 protests, which took place under the presidency of so-called “moderate” Hassan Rouhani when the Iran lobby was fully operationalised (despite these protests being bloodiest in the regime’s history). Khamenei is once again seeking to re-invigorate the manufactured hardliner-reformist narrative, revive the Iran lobby in the West and peddle the illusion of “legitimacy”.

These three factors  should be enough – from the Ayatollah’s view – to undermine Iranian opposition abroad and prevent the West from supporting the Iranian people. This is all the more important as the signs indicate Iran will soon experience another wave of protests.

But the superficial facelift the Islamic Republic has received through Pezeshkian’s presidency will not change the regime’s direction. Since 2019, Khamenei has been clear that the regime has what he describes as a pre-destined “railway track” that cannot be altered. It doesn’t matter which president is driving the train, the destination is the same. Pezeshkian’s presidency offers the ayatollah and the IRGC more breathing space. While Pezeshkian’s administration and the Iran lobby will be flirting with the West – not least a lovestruck EU – Khamenei and the IRGC will be able to advance the regime’s policies, from expanding its nuclear programme (a weaponisation project in all but name) to supporting its terrorist proxies.

Kasra Aarabi is the director for IRGC Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)