After his predecessor Qasem Soleimani cultivated and armed radical proxy forces throughout the region, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s current Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani allocated much of his time and effort to ensuring that these forces could work in tandem towards shared goals of destroying Israel and eroding the US’s regional security architecture.

There were many indications that Qaani’s approach had born significant fruit: Hezbollah helped to train and arm the Houthis, Iranian proxies had set up integrated command rooms in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and these groups launched coordinated attacks against Israel after Hamas’s massacre on October 7 in order to disrupt the IDF campaign to eradicate Hamas from Gaza.

When the Iran-led axis was on the rise, all members enjoyed a shared enhancement of prestige and capabilities. Severe setbacks, including organisational decapitation and major degradation of capabilities of the axis’s most experienced, effective and disciplined member, Hezbollah, may now portend collective decline.

As Iran’s “Crown Jewel”, Hezbollah served as a model for emulation for the Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Gaza. And, in fact, the Lebanese terror group helped to formulate these militias in their image. Hezbollah trained and armed groups like the Houthis with much of the same Iranian weaponry and tactics that it uses, and the quantum leap in military capabilities that previously ragtag militias made over the past decade can be largely attributed to the outside support received from Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC’s Quds Force.

Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah filled the void in the management of the broader Axis of Resistance left by Soleimani’s demise in 2020. It was Nasrallah who reportedly interviewed Mustafa al-Kadhimi that same year, who was vying to become Iraq’s next prime minister to protect Iran’s interests. As a 2022 study for the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point noted, the Houthis’ Jihad Council has housed not only an IRGC representative but also a Lebanese Hezbollah deputy. Ditto for Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.

In addition, the highly effective Houthi media and influence apparatus is based on Hezbollah training and instruction and is even located within the Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut. For the foreseeable future, as Hezbollah now struggles to recover from the precise and painful blows it is suffering at the hands of the IDF, it will likely have reduced bandwidth (and prestige) for mentoring the more junior proxy militias that Tehran seeks to cultivate. The Houthis have already pledged to bolster Hezbollah in its hour of need, which was a reversal in the dynamics of their relations as in the past it was originally Hezbollah helping the Houthis.

It is also important to consider the impact that the devastating IDF strikes on Hezbollah will have on the Axis of Resistance’s global influence activities. Media and soft power operations can be highly effective tools for terrorist groups to radicalise supporters and demoralise opponents. Hezbollah, the Houthis and other Iran affiliates utilise such capabilities in order to draw in and retain members while convincing domestic and foreign opponents that resistance to their extremist agenda is futile. Yet, outside of hermetically sealed information environments (of which there are few in the smartphone age), the dissemination of propaganda that is obviously divorced from reality will have very limited impact.

The IDF’s decimation of Hezbollah will make it significantly more difficult for Tehran’s proxies and partners to credibly claim to the public that it is enjoying inevitable or divinely granted success, while radical organisations known to be in decline will enjoy few supporters and suffer emboldened foes.

But this could still be an opportunity for the Houthis. Following their attacks on Israel and international shipping in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel, the Houthis experienced a meteoric rise in the international arena. Therefore the Houthis may now seek to fill the void in Iran’s broader proxy and partner network left by a weakened Hezbollah, especially given their documented track record in shutting down international commerce in the Red Sea and using anti-ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history against commercial vessels.

They may seek to do so for a variety of reasons, including the prospect of attracting greater economic support from Iran to maintain stability while their economy continues its slow collapse resulting from perpetual conflict and misrule. One could also imagine that the Houthis would view the decline of Hezbollah as an opportunity to place themselves first in line to receive the best training and equipment that Iran has to offer, which they could then use in the service of rallying domestic support and extorting concessions from their neighbours. And finally, Sanaa may see compelling ideological and geopolitical reasons for “holding the line” as the massive blows suffered by Hezbollah place the Iran-led axis on its back foot.

Yet however the Houthis should react to the blasts in Beirut, the present moment is an opportune time for those seeking stability in the Middle East to roll back the radical regime in Sanaa. Houthi missile attacks against international shipping and their neighbours throughout the region have already proved that Sanaa is a major threat to international security as well as the global economy.

Instead of their hold on power moderating the regime, there are credible indications that the Houthis aims to turn northern Yemen into the North Korea of the Middle East. Failure to address the Houthi threat at an opportune moment, while the axis is disarray, will likely result in the entrenchment and expansion of a threat that will terrorise the region and the international community for the foreseeable future.

It is still far too soon to dismiss Hezbollah, which retains tens of thousands of well-trained soldiers and powerful weaponry. At the same time, after losing much of its senior leadership, it is difficult to imagine that the secretive and compartmentalised organisation can quickly recover from its recent defeats by hastily appointing replacements for those who have been assassinated, and regain the confidence of the rank and file.

As Iran remains pre-occupied with ensuring the survival of its “crown jewel” and Hezbollah remains out of commission due to organisational chaos caused by IDF strikes, the dangerous Houthi regime appears vulnerable and the opportunity to degrade the organisation’s capabilities and leadership seem ripe. This should occur before an Iranian decision to bolster the Houthis’ capabilities to compensate for Hezbollah’s losses within the Iran-led axis. After all, the threat is growing as the Houthis launched one of its largest attacks on US warships in recent weeks, with 23 projectiles including missiles and drones.

Jason M Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute

Ari Heistein was chief of staff and a research fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He works in defense technology and has published extensive research on Yemen