V The murder of Rabbi Zvi Kogan in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), allegedly by three Uzbek nationals, should serve as a warning shot for Jewish communities around the world.
Iran has been seeking to settle accounts with Israel after a series of losses in its proxy network and its own air defence system on Iranian soil. A heightened terror campaign against soft targets in the Jewish world is a very real threat.
The Tehran regime has attempted multiple operations against Israeli and Jewish targets in the Middle East and beyond. There has been an uptick in such plots, from Europe to South America and from Africa to Asia. It has even sought to kill current and former Israeli officials. But its lack of success in such campaigns against protected individuals in Israel’s defence and security establishment has likely increased the pressure from decision-makers in Tehran for lower-level operatives to aim for softer targets such as Rabbi Kogan, who was a Chabad emissary in the UAE.
Iran has an extensive apparatus for extra-territorial operations. It operates predominantly through two main nodes: the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Ministry of Intelligence has a history of operations in the UAE. For example, in 2020 its agents kidnapped Iranian dissident Jamshid Sharmahd from Dubai and renditioned him back to Iran where he was later tried and executed. In 2013, British-Iranian businessman Abbas Yazdi also vanished from Dubai.
The Iranian Intelligence Ministry has employed the Zindashti drug cartel led by Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti, which has been involved in murders in the UAE. Tehran has also provided al-Qaeda with refuge on Iranian soil, including Uzbek nationals. For example, the US government sanctioned an Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union facilitator, Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (also known as Jafar al-Uzbeki), an Uzbek national, in 2014, who is part of this facilitation pipeline.
The IRGC leads parallel efforts, through its Quds Force and Intelligence Organisation.
Recent reporting suggests Kataib Hezbollah, an IRGC proxy that has an IRGC representative on its Shura Council, has been active in targeting Jewish centres in Uzbekistan.
Iran maintains connections with many other criminal gangs such as the Mocro Mafia, which it has used to harm its opponents in the past. The Emirati authorities arrested Redouane Taghi, its leader, in Dubai in 2019. A plot by Islamic State, which has presence in Central Asia, should also not be ruled out in Rabbi Kogan’s case given the arrests of three Uzbek nationals.
Tehran may opt to double down on such tools in retaliation for Israeli strikes as it remains exposed to military action with its air defences degraded and its broader proxy network, especially Hezbollah, weakened. Choosing terror campaigns is a safer way for Iran to attempt to re-establish deterrence than direct military strikes on Israel again. However, in the end, the US, the UK and their regional allies and partners cannot allow Iranian attacks against Jews abroad to become normalised. Handling these cases solely as law enforcement matters will ensure the Iranian leadership continues to calculate that the benefits of such terror outweighs the costs, which are absorbable. This is because mere criminal penalties against three Uzbek nationals do not touch the Iranian leadership. Economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military force are necessary to change the Iranian risk calculus.
The UAE retains leverage over the Iranians as they value their economic access to Dubai and other cities. Washington and London should work closely with the UAE to ensure that Tehran is not allowed to use Emirati territory as a launchpad for terrorism. Rabbi Kogan’s murder was not only an attack on the State of Israel and the Jewish people, but also the UAE and the spirit of the Abraham Accords. A decisive response is necessary.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran. He is also a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Programme, where research focuses on Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and its relationship with Israel