Around a year ago I stood just outside Moshav Avivim, looking into Maroun El Ras. I could see (with binoculars) the large cardboard cutout of former IRGC Commander Qasem Soleimani ominously pointing south. The Soleimani prop, alongside a model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock, was part of the Iranian Park built by Hezbollah in tribute to the former Iranian military commander who devised the doctrine of surrounding Israel with brutal proxy armies. The park was set up after he was killed by the US military, at the end of President Trump’s first term in January 2020.
What I could not have seen that day was the vast underground network and military infrastructure embedded in villages just like Maroun EL Ras, across the length of the shared border. These underground fortresses that stood ready to facilitate their plan to invade the Galilee have now been destroyed. What seemed unimaginable a year ago as we approach the second Trump administration is now real: Nasrallah and so many of the senior Hezbollah commanders are now reunited with Soleimani.
Unlike the Gaza front that caught everyone by surprise, the IDF had well prepared plans to decapitate Hezbollah and they appear to have been implemented with a high level of competence and sophistication. As well as removing the infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of the border and killing the high command, the IDF were successful in removing at least 70 per cent of the missile array held by Hezbollah a year ago. Weapons storage and manufacturing, too, have been set back decades. Hezbollah has been severely decimated - but not completely vanquished. Nevertheless, here are 10 reasons why a ceasefire was the right decision.
1 In today’s world there are seldom knockout victories, so it is best to convert military gains to political dividends when the operational criteria have been met. In this case the objective was the conquest of those immediate villages like Maroun El Ras that have direct site into Israel.
2 Both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s interests were served keeping Israel in a perpetual state of low intensity conflict (LIC, that characterised the first 10 months of the war, prior to ‘operation beeper’ and the land incursion). From their perspective LIC drains Israel militarily, socially, economically and diplomatically.
3 On the Israeli side it was widely popular to give the forces a breather. Both the standing army and the overburdened reservists are well overdue a break. Israel was not built for long wars and the fatigue, economic and societal cost weigh heavy on the public.
4 Israel scored two valuable diplomatic assets from the Biden administration and credit is due to the outgoing president as well as his tenacious envoy, Amos Hochstein. The first was inserting the US full-on into the future arbitration mechanism, whereas in the 17 years since 2006 it was the UN that criminally failed to hold Hezbollah to account for their blatant violations.
5 The second key achievement is the side-agreement between Israel and the US over ‘imminent threats’ that can be dealt with at the sole discretion of the IDF (with longer term threats referred to the US led monitoring committee).
6 As Prime Minister Netanyahu said in his announcement of the deal, the first benefit of a ceasefire in Lebanon is allowing the military to focus on the Iranian threat.
7 In the same address he offered an unsubtle criticism of the Biden administration: “It is no secret that there have been big delays in weapons and munitions deliveries.” If this is the case it makes sense to avoid any gaps in capability and, mindful of the other fronts, it was a good time to press pause.
8 Netanyahu alluded to the next president being more amenable to supplying all the weapons Israel wants. We will see. Either way, this agreement was coordinated with and approved by the Trump team. President-elect Trump has made it clear he prefers deals to wars.
9 The deal breaks the connectivity, separates the fronts and isolates Hamas. One can only hope that the increased focus on Hamas will lead to a breakthrough and the release of the hostages.
10 There is also a dividend among the wider international community. Following the outrageous decision by the ICC to issue arrest warrants, a reduction in fighting is a favourable optic. It should be positively noted that even though the Starmer government withdrew its defence of Netanyahu and Gallant, nevertheless last week the British Army still hosted the IDF Chief of Staff for meetings alongside other NATO chiefs in the UK.
Despite all this, the deal faced criticism from opposition politicians and local heads of the northern communities. They argued this was a surrender agreement, just at the time Israel should be pushing on, as the circumstances presented the opportunity for even more military accomplishments. Another critique is that once the IDF redeploys out of the southern Lebanese villages, their residents will be allowed to return. Many of the critics had hoped for a type of buffer zone or demilitarised area on the Lebanese side (similar to Kissinger’s plan on the Syrian front that has held since 1974). Another cause for concern that we have already seen in the first few days is that Hezbollah is testing the agreement on the ground. There is speculation that there may be days of renewed fighting ahead, particularly in this adjustment period and while the IDF remain deployed inside southern Lebanon till towards the end of January.
Ultimately, the truest test will be when the residents of the north feel confident in returning and rebuilding their homes. In some places that is already happening. The objective must be the complete rehabilitation of the northern communities so devastated by over a year of sustained attacks. This will take time.
Richard Pater is Director of Israel and Middle East think tank BICOM
