The Matthew Hedges case is the latest reminder that Arab allies can be frustrating and embarrassing for British diplomats. Many in the UK will feel understandable distaste for Britain’s cosy relations with the Middle East’s illiberal leaders, including extensive arms sales.

In response to the Hedges case, as well as the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and the devastating Saudi and UAE-led intervention in Yemen, the public can be forgiven for asking why our politicians and diplomats invest such energy in staying friends with Arab governments, whose actions frequently contradict British values.

The uncomfortable answer is that the Middle East matters. It affects our security and economic welfare, and the ability to influence the region rests on strong ties with its leaders. Indeed, several long term regional trends – highlighted in a new Bicom report – suggest that this will only increase in the years ahead.

First, Britain will become more sensitive to global energy markets as its oil and gas dependency is set to rise from 38 per cent in 2018 to 69 per cent in 2035, with the Middle East still accounting for one third of global oil and 15-20 per cent of gas.

Second, the region’s sharp demographic growth – projected to soar from 570m today to 840m by 2050 – is increasing both threats and opportunities. The UK already exports more to the Middle East than China, and the population increase is only expanding these markets whilst driving an urgent programme of economic diversification, especially among oil rich states.

At the same time, population growth is driving urbanization, increasing pressure on resources and exacerbating youth underemployment. That means the risk of social unrest and Islamist radicalisation will remain potent. This presents a risk not only to the stability of states in the region, but to mainland Europe, which is impacted directly by migratory waves and Jihadist threats, which in turn fuel populist nationalism on the continent.

In addition, radical anti-Western Islamist ideologies, while repudiated by most Muslims, have a proven ability to draw a fringe of British and European Muslims into extremist violence with devastating effects. The Muslim population of the EU (plus Norway and Switzerland) is projected to exceed 10 per cent by 2050.

For all of these reasons, the UK has a profound interest in successful, managed reform of Arab state economies and governments structures – necessary to cope with soaring population growth and avert political crises that anti-Western extremists could exploit. 

Third, the region poses a long-term nuclear proliferation risk that needs to be contained. The Iran nuclear deal only puts temporary limits on its nuclear programme. This causes deep alarm to its Sunni Arab neighbours and Israel, and Saudi Arabia has publicly committed to match Iranian nuclear capabilities.

Fourth, US regional influence will continue to decline, as its global hegemony gradually recedes; as internal divisions weaken its international capabilities; and as the Middle East declines in importance to its interests. Despite enduring US military superiority, Syria showed how a determined Russia can exploit US hesitancy to shape the region in line with its interests. Meanwhile, China’s Middle East footprint is also growing as part of its ‘Belt and Road’ initiative.   

Successive UK governments have recognised the importance of reinforcing Britain’s own capacity to influence the region, including diplomatic, economic and military capabilities. Theresa May visited the Gulf three times in the 18 months following the Brexit vote. Britain is a global leader in development assistance, especially to help states cope with Syrian refugees. And the UK has invested in naval bases in Oman and Bahrain, as well as RAF facilities in Qatar and the UAE. The UK has also shown the need to work closely with France and Germany, even as it exits the EU, to protect shared interests in the region.

Yet Britain’s capabilities lag behind its ambitions. The Foreign Office budget was cut by 16 per cent between 2010 and 2015. As of July 2018, just 30 per cent of officers in Arabic language posts speak Arabic, well below the FCO’s 80 per cent target.

Meanwhile the Defence Select Committee has warned of significant long term shortfalls in funding for military equipment vital for the UK to maintain force projection capability.

No less importantly, there is a deep ambivalence among the public about Britain’s global role, reflected in part by the Brexit vote. The Iraq War still casts its shadow, and the 2013 parliamentary decision not to intervene against Assad’s chemical weapons showed the sensitivity of intervention decisions to the domestic political mood. Jeremy Corbyn has shown a near-total opposition to military intervention, and in 2015 led 152 Labour MPs to vote even against military action targeting Isis in Syria. 

To safeguard its interests as it redefines its post-Brexit international role, Britain must reaffirm its commitment to promoting development, stability, and security in the Middle East. This means maintaining close ties with regional states, even whilst seeking to address their problematic governance and actions. Policymakers need to make the case for this domestically, ensuring there is political support for the necessary engagement and investment across the full range of foreign policy tools.

Toby Greene is a research fellow and adjunct lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and senior research associate for Bicom