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Some of you may find what you’re about to read disturbing, as we broadcasters are wont to say. Those of a sensitive disposition are advised to remove their spectacles now.
OK, you’ve been warned.
So, here goes. Imagine a brother and sister who decide to have sex together. They use two forms of contraceptive to ensure no pregnancy can result. They enjoy the experience but decide to keep it a secret and not to repeat it. They are entirely undamaged by it and continue to live perfectly normal emotional lives.
What do you think? Was what they did wrong?
Yuk! What a ludicrous, offensive question. Of course it was. But why? Perhaps because of the danger they would produce an impaired child. But, no, we’ve discounted that possibility. Perhaps because of the inevitable psychological trauma. But, no, we’ve been told that the episode left them unharmed. Why, then?
Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist now at New York University, calls these sorts of cases “moral dumbfounding.” People try to offer a rationale but eventually reason runs out of steam. They’re still convinced that it’s wrong, but they’re puzzled as to why. They scratch their heads seeking, and failing, to find reasons to justify their conviction.
Haidt’s work on moral dumbfounding is one of many experiments he’s conducted and part of a centuries-old battle between those who think our views are governed by reason, and those who argue that emotion holds sway. For fans of reason, it’s not comforting news.
In one of many striking metaphors Haidt talks about the Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Our intuitions do almost all the work: reason steps in later, as post-hoc justification. In another evocative metaphor, Haidt refers to reason as the spin doctor of the emotions. He’s also described the mind as being like a rider on an elephant. The tiny little rider is the conscious, reasoning part of our brains — the 1%. The rest, the 99%, is the elephant, the automatic processes hidden from view.
More recently, Haidt has turned his psychological gaze on politics. In particular, and based on a vast collection of questionnaire data, he’s sketched out a sort of typology that explains why conservatives and liberals can’t agree.
He describes five sources of moral intuition. There is the harm principle (people shouldn’t be hurt), the fairness principle (people should be treated justly), group loyalty (we owe special obligations to our family, friends, neighbours, compatriots), respect for authority (and the need to maintain order), and notions of purity/sanctity (for example, about the body, or the burning of the national flag).
The first two (harm and fairness) are what motivate liberals. They’re quick to dismiss the other three as being irrelevant to morality. But, the more conservative you are, the more seriously you take these others. Liberals, to adapt another Haidt metaphor, are restricted to the BBC and ITV, while conservatives adopt a more multi-channel approach.
These results, these differences between the political left and right, have been replicated by Haidt in numerous countries around the world.
Haidt was raised in a relatively assimilated Jewish family in New York.
All four of his grandparents were born in Russia and Poland — and worked in the schmutter trade. He says he has a strong Jewish identity but no Jewish faith.
Religion is best analysed as falling within his group-loyalty category: he describes religion as “a team sport.”
And he accuses atheists like Richard Dawkins, who bang on about the irrationality of religious belief, of missing the point.
Intriguingly, his research has made the liberal Haidt far more open to conservative ideas. Professor Haidt now pleads with his liberal friends — who dominate research in the humanities — to show a bit more humility, to be a little more open-minded, less smug, to recognise they may not have a monopoly on the truth.
Certainly reading Jonathan Haidt brings a whole new perspective to the appeal of Donald Trump. Brexit, too.
David Edmonds is a journalist with the BBC.
@David Edmonds 100