Anxiety over its crumbling influence in the Middle East forced the British government to approve an uneasy alliance with Israel shortly before the 1956 Suez campaign.
Secret papers released last week by the National Archives reveal fears about the hostile stance of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and about Israeli reaction to Arab war threats. Notes taken in March 1956 by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, show that in the face of Nasser’s growing military relationship with the Soviet Union, ministers reluctantly agreed that Israel could be a key ally.
Addressing his colleagues in sombre tones, Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Lloyd told them that the UK had erred in seeing the Egyptian leader as “our best bet in the Middle East”.
According to Sir Norman’s notes, he continued: “He [Nasser] is moving into Russian arms. He has built up his name as leader of the Arab world. He won’t seek or accept any settlement with Israel.” Nasser, he said, had attacked Britain’s position in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. It was time “to go for him, while recognising he will be a formidable opponent”.
A Cabinet minute showed that the Foreign Secretary had swayed his colleagues. The Cabinet “supports this view on Nasser. Write him off and see him off,” they said. As part of this policy it was important to bolster Israel’s position, argued Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, while at the same time betraying British distaste at the prospect of fighting alongside Israel.
Sir Norman records him as telling ministers: “What Israel needs are interceptors [aircraft]... We have sent some night Meteors. It is appalling to have to fight with Israel versus the Arabs [but] we must strengthen Israel to forestall it.”
Another defence chief told the Cabinet that Israel should be warned against digging in on the Syrian frontier, “thereby provoking the Syrians”. They had been so warned on several occasions, said the Foreign Secretary.